Bulwark Intelligence

Linkedin Instagram Envelope
Edit Content

BORDER SECURITY

BORDER SECURITY, CURATED OSINT, Reports, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

UNDERSTANDING EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL AND HOW POLITICAL INSTABILITY FOSTER CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENTS FOR INSECURITY

/

Across states in the Sahel region, the continued mix of terrorism, organized crime and intercommunal violence remain significantly high. Terrorists have so far exploited Indigenous animosities given the absence of the Government in such porous environments, thus giving way to Salafist-jihadi ideology. Jihadi driven armed violence can be seen manifest in the three border areas of Niger (Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua, Tillaberi, Regions), Burkina Faso (Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, Est, Nord, Sahel regions), and Mali (Gao, Mopti, Tombouctou), stretching to the Lake Chad swamps which connect Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, as well as pockets of erratic manifestation in Benin and Togo’s Northern axis. Terrorist actors include the trio of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Dine (Mali), and al-Mourabitoun (a breakaway group from Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO), now known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) because of their merger in 2017. Also is JNIM’s most formidable adversary, The Islamic State Sahel Province, which was formally known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) a part of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province since March 2019, ISSP comprises of MUJAO faction (a breakaway group from AQIM) that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/IS) in 2015, Macina Liberation Front (an affiliate of Ansar al-Dine) and defectors from JNIM (2017). Other relatively active stand-alone groups in the Sahel include Boko Haram – Jamaatu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Dawati wal-Jihad, Ansaroul Islam (the Burkina Faso branch of Ansar al-Dine), and Unidentified armed militias. The impact of Islam in Africa’s Sahel parts via trade, during the spread of Islam across the African continent, has been influential in shaping some native societies here in Africa, particularly in the North as with the Tuareg. Islam and Arabic in various forms, helped with the smooth indoctrination of local groups while also maintaining traditional values, such as food, dress, and language, among others. This intriguing synergy between religion in this case Islam and ethnicity was heavily exploited by Salafi-jihadist groups, who are known to use such exploitation tactics in asserting their domination and subsequent control with false Quranic Teachings. So, after suffering significant losses in the realisation of its utopian Caliphate state in the Middle East and Asia, Al-Qaeda and its off-shoot group Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) choose Africa, given the pre-existing levels of dysfunctionality and instability across states in the Sahel region. While cultural and theological similarities with the Middle East, as well as their pre-existing Islamist militia agitations, gave way for the indoctrination with Salafist-jihadi ideology. For over a decade of conflict and instability in the Sahel, ungoverned spaces in the Sahel have served as transit routes for organized criminal syndicates who manage major migrants’ movement northward to Europe as well as the smuggling of illegal drugs, weapons and goods. Such an environment was only naturally likely to deteriorate, creating a suitable environment for degenerates given the absence of comprehensive Government interventions in curbing insecurity. The national government’s continued use of militarized intervention vis-a-vis its security-focused approach in curbing varying forms of conflict has seen kinetics taken much prioritization over adopting non-kinetic measures in addressing the underlying issues such as environmental degradation (illegal mining, erosion, drought, desert incursions), political instability (sustained conflicts at the regional, state, and ethnoreligious levels, civil agitation), inadequate infrastructures for the improvement of life (bad roads, unstable educational institutions, poor labour/consumer rights, poor health facilities, uneven allocation of wealth/disparity in the class system, unemployment), high levels of corruption in the polity (embezzlement of nations funds, cybercrime, nepotism and bigotry), fluctuating high levels of human rights abuses, and increasing national debt much of which enable conflict in the first place. This is not to say that there haven’t been non-kinetic approaches to dealing with conflict by both national and international actors; however, the question is how feasible these interventions were in light of the transnational impact of these actions; because it is quite convenient for one country to push out insurgents only for them to regroup and return or the deliberate actions and negligence on the part of state-sponsored militias in escalating tensions through extrajudicial targeted executions. The success of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is dependent on the government’s stability, which is reflected in the competence of its security apparatus as well as the patriotism of its citizenry a typical example is Niger. Despite the country’s fragile stability, Niger has seen a significant decrease in Jihadist activities this year for a variety of reasons, one of which is attributed to forces of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprised of Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon land and air counter-terrorism military formations operating under the auspices of Operation Lake Sanity. Also, Niger currently hosts France led Operation Barkhane and Takuba Taskforce, as well as a US drone base in the Agadez region involved in various intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance operations in the region. However, coups, corruption, and disagreement among allies, on the other hand, are capable of hampering COIN efforts, allowing insurgents to re-strategize, carry out additional attacks, and control more territory, extending their reach and propaganda dissemination. The growth of military coups demonstrates the military’s negative impact on regional political stability. This intra-state disorder has shifted the attention away from terrorist organizations and toward generating an even larger imbalance in the unstable political environment. However, political instability persists in Mali and Burkina Faso.   Mali has experienced two coups on 18 August 2020 and 24 May 2021 respectively, leaving the country in complete isolation as a result of its ban from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as sanctions imposed by regional partners, ECOWAS, which froze Malian state assets, closed its borders affecting trade, and suspended non-essential financial transactions. Though its military has shown signs of giving up control to a transitional administration, its body language remains focused on retaining control over governance rather than preventing terrorist organizations from obtaining new grounds. In Burkina Faso, the military junta which took control of the country through a coup

BORDER SECURITY, CURATED OSINT, INTELLIGENCE, Uncategorized

TRAFFICKING IN THE SAHEL; THE RESURGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NIGER REPUBLIC.

/

The road map for Trafficking operations; Niger has been identified as a transshipment port of the Sahel. This implies that the country is a strategic and pivotal location for emerging trade routes and a transit access point for other West African countries to North Africa. It has also been recognized as an originating location where illegal resources are smuggled and migrant workers are either abducted or recruited by traffickers with close ties to networks in countries like Libya, Togo, Morocco, and Nigeria. It is inadvertently linked to international organized crime syndicates in the Middle East, Europe, and the Gulf, which are the major benefactors of most of the identified illegal networks. The use of the Lebanon-Togo – Niger route with access points in the Agadez, Niamey, and Tillaberi regions has been the predominant route of most of these trafficking operations since 2018. Recently, there was an identified increase in the range of the illegal network as trafficking activities spiked in the Maradi and Zinder regions of the country. The relationship between trafficking and terrorism in Niger.: Following the history of trafficking operations in the Sahel, one could deduce that there is a thin line between terrorism and trafficking operations as their operations tend to intertwine. These range from arms trafficking to abductions and control of border areas. Trafficking is the major avenue used in funding terrorist groups like the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in West Africa Province(ISWAP), Boko Haram, and The Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS-EIGS) terrorist sects which are active within Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua regions. International trafficking networks usually hire militants to aid operations thereby instigating strategic attacks targeting trade routes of the country. The knowledge that control of border routes enables easy access for trafficking operations heightens the risk of traffickers funding terrorism in the Sahel thereby fostering the rise of trafficking networks across the country. The role of government officials in Niger’s trafficking networks.: Although the Central Office for Illicit Trafficking (ORCTIS) agency in close alliance with the Anti Traffic Airport Cell (CEET) made considerable efforts in curbing trafficking operations in 2021 and January 2022 across the different regions in the country through security operations, the issue seems to persist. The governing bodies have recorded both successes and failures over the years. Drug trafficking has a direct negative impact on different levels of governance as governance can be a major obstacle to this growing industry. There have been claims that traffickers have infiltrated government institutions and even go as far as endorsing certain political officials. Instances of loopholes in the credence of political elites have fostered demands for the implementation of certain policies that enable investigations into government officials. The most recent incident was the arrest of the Mayor of Fachi on 3 January 2022. It was believed that he used government vehicles to transport illegal drugs through the Agadez-Tahoua route. On 28 January 2022, a joint security operation led to the dismantling of an international migrant trafficking operation in Niamey and Maradi. This comes after successive reports of other raid operations to curb various drug trafficking networks in different regions of the country. During one of the operations over 119 bricks of cocaine worth 11 billion FCFA in Fachi was seized en route to the Agadez-Tahoua regions. The anti-trafficking agency (OCRTIS) revealed that in January 2022, nine related operations were carried out in the country. These and other similar incidents point to a significant rise in illicit drugs, arms, and human trafficking within the nation’s territory. For years, Niger has been in the trafficking limelight in regards to reports of child labour in the Arlit gold mines in Agadez and drug and weapons trafficking in Tahoua.  

BORDER SECURITY, COUNTER INSURGENCY, CURATED OSINT, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

THE UPSURGE OF BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR NORTH REGION OF CAMEROON

/

Since 2014 the Nigerian based terrorist group Boko Haram has been carrying out assassinations and large-scale acts of violence in Cameroon, and for years now, the Republic of Cameroon has been living in a continuous sequence of armed attacks attributed to the insurgent group. These continuous attacks have resulted in tension in the Far North region of the country as they are usually indiscriminate, targeting both civilians and GSF. However, GSF posts and camps are generally the main targets. The insurgence of the incursions in the region could be attributed to the fact that the region shares a border with Nigeria which has been immensely troubled by Boko Haram activities, coupled with the fact that they have gone through leadership crisis and are currently seeking to expand their territory from Northern Nigeria to neighbouring countries including Cameroon. The Islamist armed group Boko Haram has stepped up attacks on civilians and security forces in towns and villages in the Far North region of Cameroon since December 2020. During the months of December 2021 and January 2022, a total of twenty-three (23) fatalities, and thirteen (13) casualties have been recorded during Boko Haram attacks, which include security officials. Intel further suggests that six individuals have also been abducted during this period.  The focal points of these terrorist attacks are the Mayo-Sava department and the Mayo-Tsanaga department in the Far North region, precisely in Mora, Masla, Kolofata, Kouape, Koza, Hitere, and Moudoukoua. The formation of self-defense groups (vigilante), to combat these attacks, has encouraged violence and arbitrated community conflicts. Significant communal conflicts have been noted in the Logone-et-Chari department, in the Far North region which has led to the displacement of thirty individuals. In 2015, the African Union established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to respond to Boko Haram attacks across the Lake Chad basin. The current anglophone crisis has played a major role in easing the activities of Boko Haram militiamen, as the army is also confronting separatist insurgency in the country’s Anglophone regions and the threat of cross-border raids by rebels in the neighboring Central African Republic, therefore, leaving the Far North region void.  The rate of these attacks has become a significant cause for worry in the Far North region. Following the previous trend, the operational environment and the population remain at the mercy of attacks as violent Islamist and inter-communal attacks are likely to persist. Therefore, it is essential for Cameroon and the multinational force to improve on the number of counter-terrorism activities carried out in the Far North region.

BORDER SECURITY, CURATED OSINT

SECESSIONIST THREATS IN WESTERN TOGOLAND

/

Introduction On 7 January 2022, the Ghanaian military arrested six suspected members of the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF), the Western Togoland secessionist group near Aflao in the Volta region. The individuals allegedly planned to attack the Bank of Ghana office in Hohoe, as well as the Adomi bridge, among other targets. Security forces in Denu in the Volta region also carried out an operation leading to the apprehension of suspects belonging to the separatist group, which has been pushing for an independent Western Togoland state since the 1970s. Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) In 1914, Britain and France invaded the German colony of Togoland in West Africa, which was bordered to the east by the British Gold Coast colony and to the west by French Dahomey (now Benin). The war’s victors separated the territory into two parts: British Togoland and French Togoland. Eventually, Western Togoland residents decided to join the Gold Coast, now Ghana, after a United Nations-supervised referendum in 1957. From 1980 to 2017, secessionism was dormant until the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF), created in 1994 resurrected the demand for Western Togoland’s autonomy even declaring independence in May 2019. Western Togoland is made up of the Volta Region, Oti Region and parts of the North East, Northern and Upper East Regions. Previous Attacks and Government’s response Prior to the latest attempt, intel had captured previous attacks in 2021. Reports indicate gunmen stormed police stations in Mepe and Aveyime in the Volta Region in the early hours of 25 September 2020. Sequel to this, reports further claimed that the armed men belonged to the Homeland Study Group Foundation. The assailants had blocked main routes going to and from the area before a joint military-police response team could bring the situation under control. They also raised their new ‘national’ flags and demanded Ghanaian security forces vacate their territory. Despite the fact that authorities were eventually able to intervene and bring the situation under control, the group reappeared four days later on 29 September 2020, with an attack on a public bus stop in Ho, the regional capital, where they set two vehicles on fire. Following this trail of events, there have been no attacks in recent times as Government security forces continue to monitor the activities of the group and conduct regular intel-led operations to avert further attacks. Present-day While the movement has struggled to gain traction, the Ghanaian government’s efforts to suppress the secessionist movement have been successful, the concept of the region gaining independence is merely an illusion, owing to the government’s use of divisive and repressive tactics, which have so far been instrumental and effective in suppressing separatism. Furthermore, the separatist aspirations are unsustainable because they do not represent the views of all ethnic groups in the region. Notwithstanding, the evolution of separatist movements highlights concerns about an underlying political crisis linked to governance deficits, equitable resource allocation, and equal political representation of marginalized groups. Ghana’s porous borders, along with threats from secessionists and transnational crime, presents a recipe for disaster in regards to national security.  

BORDER SECURITY, CURATED OSINT

EXPLOSION OF INSURGENT ATTACKS IN SOUTHERN CAMEROON

/

The introduction of exotic weapons in targeted attacks on Government Security Forces (GSF) by the Ambazonian Defense Forces (ADF) group in Cameroon is a game-changer that has left the playing ground uneven for the Cameroonian Armed Forces (CAF). Following the repression of the 2016-2017 protests, a new agitation for the freedom of the Northwest and Southwest provinces known as the Anglophone region resurfaced. The stir birthed a series of attacks on the Cameroonian military by the guerilla southern Cameroon defenders known as ‘Ambaboys’. As a result, the State responded to this conflict by deploying armed men to the Southern Cameroons; a policy that has regrettably transformed the region into a war zone. Over time, the separatists have carried out several attacks, mainly using locally made weapons and ambushes. In the same vein, security forces launched counter-insurgency operations and are often engaged in gunfights with the insurgents. Eventually, the Ambazonian warriors began to amass guns and explosives as booties of war from the corpses of their slain victims. They became powerful with each successful attack and gained sufficient momentum to occupy the Anglophone region. In April 2021, an agreement was struck between the group and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), although the alliance was reportedly denounced by both parties. However, there are speculations that the connection was not severed as border operations continued to foster a free flow of weapons. Between May and September 2021, there were more than fifteen (15) cases of attacks with  Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mainly targeting the military. Things took a new turn following the RPG used in an attack on military convoys in Sagba, Ngo-ketunjia department of the North region on 16 September 2021, where more than 14 deaths were recorded. The recent display of high-grade ammunition by secessionist fighters has come as a shock to the government who now believe that there is an external body supplying these weapons. In November 2021, the Fako department was rocked by a series of bomb explosions.  In Molyko in Buea, a bomb went off in a vehicle resulting in one fatality. The attack was launched by separatist fighters as a punitive measure for non-adherence to the habitual lockdown imposed on Mondays. An amphitheater in the university of Buea was equally nuked by the separatists. In the Northwest, Bamenda recorded two cases of explosions on 12 November 2021, leaving at least six dead. An IED attack on GSF by separatist forces was logged at Ngoketunjia department of Northwest region.  The rate of these attacks and the weapons used are becoming a significant cause for worry. The concern however, is the effect of these new developments on Anglophone communities. Following the previous trend, the population will be at the mercy of attacks and restrictions on movements and business activities. Furthermore, security operations equally tend to cost the lives of the citizens as residents are often caught amidst gunfights, sporadic shootings and are often tortured to give up the hideouts of the separatists. The era of the big guns and explosives is here, a period when the citizens look up again to the promise of safety the elected leaders made. One wonders what policies would be enacted to resolve this conflict, and what happens if these policies fail.

BORDER SECURITY, CURATED OSINT, GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS, SECURITY THREATS

POLITICAL GABEGIE (BENIN REPUBLIC)

/

INTRODUCTION President Patrice Talon, a business tycoon who was known for financing politicians, promised to stay in office for one term when he came into office for the first time in 2016. He is an independent candidate supported by a host of political parties amongst which are the Progressive Union and the Republican bloc. He had tried to promulgate a law where successive presidents can only have one office term; this was however rejected by the law makers. Following his victory in the 2021 election by 86% of total votes, and his endorsement by the constitutional court on Thursday, April 15 2021. Joel Aivo, a disqualified presidential candidate of Front for the Restoration of Democracy was apprehended for terrorist crimes. Paul Hounkpe, the running mate of Alassane Soumanou of Cowry Front for an Emerging Benin who came second with 11.37% of the total vote, was declared head of the opposition. Drastic quell of tension on the political scene was predominant. A wave of change in the executive team of the president’s second tenure is expected when President Patrice Talon kick starts his second tenure by 23rd May 2021. Series of court proceedings on prominent politicians and protesters arrested are also expected Despite the assertion of the election’s credibility by the International community and independent observers, the court’s proceedings of Reckya Madougo and Joel Aivo as well as other election prisoners will attract the attention of the International society.  ARREST/DEMONSTRATION The Beninese political climate has since February 2021 reported an increase in political tension, following the disqualification of 17 of the 20 candidates running for Presidency. The two retained candidates Alassane Soumanou of Cowry Front for an Emerging Benin and Corentine Kohoue, a dissident figure who were to face the incumbent President Patrice Talon were neither considered as equal to the task nor oppositions of the president as many disqualified candidates and members of the opposition may have considered their political forces as not formidable enough. Many disqualified candidate had begun to form alliances when Reckya Madougou was apprehended on her way from a meeting with other party representatives. Reports also showed an increasing crackdown on politicians and protesters by the Cour de Repressions des Infractions Economiques et du Terrorisme (the Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism) before and after the election. Notable arrests made were the arrest of Sebastien Ajouvon (a presidential candidate who came third in 2016 presidential election), Bio Tijani Dramane (a prominent partisan of the Democrat Party) and Reckya Madougou before the election while Joel Aivo and about fifteen people were arrested at the residence of judge Essowe Batamoussi (a judge who resigned from CRIET denouncing irregularities and fled the country) after the election . The arrest of Reckya Madougou coupled with several irregularities noted during the election screening had propelled the wave of civil unrest that swept through the country from 5th to 7th April, 2021. A faction of protesters in support of the incumbent president also demonstrated in retaliation to the violent demonstration by the opposition noted across the county from 5th of April notably in Collines and Bante departments. PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE Protest demonstrations against the illegal remanding of the President on the seat gave room to riots, kidnapping and other forms of violence across the country as clashes were also  noted between hunters and the Republican police in the Bante of Collines department. The hunters’ group are known to have wrecked havoc during the election across the cities of Gouka, Bante, Savelou, Agbon, Mamatchoke and Save in Collines. Gunfire exchange by the group, other unidentified armed men and the GSF left five dead across the nation during the elections period. The elections could not be conducted in 16 polling units across the nation as five deaths were recorded in the Collines department from multiple violent demonstrations and armed clashes reported in the department. OUTLOOK Due to the peculiarity of court proceedings, political tension is likely to rise if the opposition seems displeased with the court’s rulings. Violence is highly probable in Collines, Bante and Littoral departments if any irregularity is noted in the rulings considering the rate of violence noted during the elections in these departments. An increase in violent crimes is highly probable in the absence of drastic security measures. There is increased risk of post-electoral violence during the May 23 presidential swearing in. An outbreak of violence, definitely will lead to humanitarian crisis, cross country migration especially into neighboring countries such as Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger and Ghana. RECOMMENDATION Businesses and Individuals are advised to be highly vigilant in violence-prone communes and departments like Collines and Borgu departments. Individuals are advised to stay indoors during violent periods. Observe any suspicious movement and immediately report to the Police or appropriate authorities.

BORDER SECURITY, GLOBAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, Reports, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

BOKO HARAM – ISIS FIGHTERS DITCH FASTING – REGROUP IN ‘UNHOLY RAMADAN ALLIANCE’.

/

‘Each country in the region has the potential to militarily defeat Boko Haram ISWAP within their boundary, but no single state can defeat them within the region’ In a desperate jihadist survival tactics, Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) have temporarily suspended their bitter rivalry to focus on the regional multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) offensives and the Nigerian Army led offensive in the Lake Chad Basin states.  Credible information confirmed that the temporary jihadist coalition has banned fasting for their fighters; joined battlefield forces with ISIS in Libya and resorted to recruiting child soldiers and suicide bombers to boost battlefield capabilities. This report calls for active regional intelligence, security and military engagement; absolute local vigilance and a sustained regional collaborative effort as part of a joint counter insurgency strategy. Rival jihadist factions loyal to both Abubakar Shekau’s JAS/Boko Haram and ISWAP have tactically regrouped along the fringes of the Lake Chad basin for the first time since major splits. However, the fissure was made worse by continuous land, Aerial and amphibious joint offensives attacks by the regional MNJTF – Nigeria; Chad; Niger and to some extent Cameroon. This was further exacerbated by the ongoing operations by the Nigerian military in some parts of Borno State led by the Army Chief, Lt. Gen Buratai. Ramadan Fasting Suspended To recover lost ground against the continuous huge battlefield deaths of several hundreds of key cell commanders and strongholds along the Lake Chad Basin, the bitter jihadists’ splinter groups have suspended fasting. It was reliably gathered that the respective Shura Councils have waived fasting for all frontline fighters during the Holy Month of Ramadan to muster energy. The jihadists have also adopted an active military style collaborative strategy with a more experienced fighting unit from Libya against the security and armed forces of the regional MNJTF and various countries’ troops. They are regrouping in a manner that is dubbed by reliable sources with knowledge of jihadist activities in the region, as the ‘unholy Ramadan Alliance of regional jihadists.’ The Unholy International Jihadist Alliance. It is believed that ASWAJ is a tactically experienced and deadly terrorist group known to operate under ISIS in Libya. The international jihadist alliance is reported to be merging its combined experienced forces and influence along the banks and islands of the Lake Chad.   The first Lake Chad Basin jihadist coalition reunion was held in mid April 2020. Sources describe the secret meeting as the start of a strategic, spiritual, tactical and operational framework building amongst the various Boko Haram and ISWAP jihadist camps with their new international network. The newly appointed Imam Goni Umar (who succeeded late Mohammed Shuwa, the ISWAP Chief Judge that was killed in an MNJTF aerial strike at Duguri), a leading ISWAP Islamic Scholar and the new Chief Judge is said to have spearheaded the jihadist coalition proceedings. In addition to ISIS in Libya, the unholy union is said to have attracted the presence of other influential and senior ISWAP commanders including one Baba-Kaka, currently the Governor of the Lake Chad general area; Mallam Ibrahim, Abu Imrana, Malam Sa’ad, Abu Abdullahi and Bako Fulgori, among other Boko Haram ISWAP local and regional war lords. The leaked outcome of the meeting has shown that a jihadist coalition is at an advanced stage. The essence is to actualise a common tactical and operational model of launching deadly coordinated attacks on Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chadian military formations within this month of Ramadan. Consequently, this further demonstrates the urgent need for regional states surveillance, awareness, preparedness and response readiness to pre-empt the jihadist coalition.  Jihadist Capacity The jihadists are re-deploying more experienced armed fighters to reinforce strategic locations in the Lake Chad Basin under the command of Baba- Kaka – the governor of the Tumbuns – with an approximate coordinate of …. (Sensitive), Lat. …. (Sensitive), – areas that suffered heavy bombardment by the regional MNJTF. Hence the dire need for the MNJTF to revisit known locations with maximum precision. Some battle experienced jihadist commanders and warlords including one Baba Isa; Abu Imrana; Abduljaleef; and Musa have been placed on standby with hundreds of jihadist fighters in the … Tumbus; Northern side of … village; Gari … located east of … and … – located close to …, respectively. They have an Approximate Cord. Long. 12…. (Sensitive) and Lat. 14… (Sensitive). Jihadist special fighters are known to be camping at… areas in the Tumbun; with an approximate cord. Long. (Sensitive) and Lat… (Sensitive). Many local fishermen who could potentially act as spies have been forced away from key areas. Some of the fishermen, some of whom the jihadist relies on for partial survival and funding activities, have all been resettled in other areas (sensitive). Jihadists’ commanders with deep knowledge of the terrain select hiding locations that are covered with dark “Kangar trees.” Areas that provide access but perfect camouflage for items as large as vehicles to move underneath for miles without detection from State Air-Force and military reconnaissance drones. To create a buffer zone, the jihadists’ militants frequently dig up trenches to shield their locations, leaving one ‘southern side’ open as entry and exit points. In most cases jihadist fortify their bases by burying mines and Improvised Explosive Device (IED’s) in anticipation for unsuspected land attacks from state and regional MNJTF.  These locations are ordinarily hard to locate and access but known routes from sources familiar with these locations can provide an effective planning response for a coordinated regional MNJTF operation. North East Nigeria Boko Haram terrorists’ group leader, Abubakar Shekau JAS faction has joined forces with the faction of Amir Borzogo to strengthen positions in camps under Bama LGA in Borno State and some part of Yobe state. These camps are strategically established to ease abductions, restock food, medical supplies and petroleum products. Jihadist attacks could easily be coordinated along the eastern part of Maiduguri. Other criminal activities include sales and rustling of cattle in Baga cattle markets and income generation through

BORDER SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

ISIS in Africa Down But Not Finished – Deploy Thé Final Punch.

/

Be it military or civilian based approach or both, the level of success or failure in counter insurgency operations is highly dependent on timely intervention. From strategic planning to launching ground and aerial operations and implementing local Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) programmes to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) interventions, perfect timing is everything and everything is perfect timing. There is no better time than now for all impacted states of the Lake chad basin (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger) to combine all available multi-agency resources and measures to crush (at least militarily) Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa province (ISWAP). The  armed groups are divided, weak and in a state of total chaos; never experienced since Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/ISIS) in 2015.   Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’ awati Wal-Jihad, otherwise known as Boko Haram terrorists’ group and splinter factions linked to the ISWAP have been forced to focus their criminal and terrorist activities largely on the fringes of Lake Chad and the porous borders of Nigeria – Cameroon – Niger Republic and Chad. The Lake Chad border region host a complex terrain of deep forest, lakes, islands and caves, which provides natural cover for armed jihadist groups. It is equally rich in agriculture, pastoralism, fishing and arms smuggling routes required by Boko Haram ISWAP jihadist for sustenance and survival. The Lake Chad region is also a magnet for wealthy merchants. These merchants frequently travel along the lagone and Chari divisions of Cameroon, the Hadjer – Lamis regions of Chad and the lake Chad/Sahel in general.   The trade route presents an ideal operating theatre for armed Boko Haram/ISWAP to mount water and road checking points and raise huge funds on a weekly basis. However, all these beneficial activities are in serious jeopardy due to internal splits, karma and recent offensives from regional states and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).    The True state of Boko Haram/ISWAP splits: They did not utter a word since their  appointed Wali, Abu Musab Habib Al Barnawi, a surviving biological son of JAL/Boko Haram terrorists group founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was controversially cornered and placed under arrest by some of his key commanders. The young and less experienced Abu Musab Al Barnawi was questioned, suspended, incarcerated and finally demoted to a mere military commander, for offences related to insubordination, usurping power amongst other extreme Sharia related infringements. Al Barnawi was replaced by his own blood brother Abu Abdullahi Ibn Umar Al Barnawi (Ba’a Idrissa), initially on a temporary basis, while internal investigations were concluded and consultation approval received from the core ISIS. They did not utter a word since their  appointed Wali, Abu Musab Habib Al Barnawi, a surviving biological son of JAL/Boko Haram terrorists group founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was controversially cornered and placed under arrest by some of his key commanders. The young and less experienced Abu Musab Al Barnawi was questioned, suspended, incarcerated and finally demoted to a mere military commander, for offences related to insubordination, usurping power amongst other extreme Sharia related infringements. Al Barnawi was replaced by his own blood brother Abu Abdullahi Ibn Umar Al Barnawi (Ba’a Idrissa), initially on a temporary basis, while internal investigations were concluded and consultation approval received from the core ISIS. Neither core ISIS, nor key ISWAP funders approved of or gave their blessing to Ba’a Idrissa’s leadership and the replacement of Al- Barnawi. Failing internally to overturn the leadership changes in a peaceful process, commanders loyal to Abu Musab Al-Barnawi including Abba Gana mounted a bloody coup. Ba’a Idrissa and four of his loyal commanders were slaughtered, accused of instigating a failed assassination plot on Al Barnawi and attempting to betray the ‘Caliphate’ to regional apostates. The bloody assassination of Ba’a Idrissa and 3 of his commanders and the narrow escape of other targeted commanders, splits ISWAP into three deadly factions. Things got worse for the ISIS and Al-Qaida linked jihadist future, when some factional commanders loyal to Abu Musab Al Barnawi blamed the ISWAP split as a direct mastermind of Boko Haram erratic and power thirsty leader, Abubakar Shekau. In August 2016, Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau (who had reluctantly pledged allegiance to ISIS leadership his group to become the first ISIS Africa Wiyalat under ISIS Abubakar Al- Baghdadi), was shocked and furious after ISIS announced that he had been replaced by his spokesman — a much younger Abu Musab Albarnawi. Shekau called the move an unforgiven betrayal and blamed the decision squarely on his deputy – Mamman Nur (Nur was key in convincing Shekau to give Bayat to ISIS Leader). Nur was a Cameroonian born and came from Maroua – Far North region and was deputy to Mohammed Yusuf. He was known to be the most strategic and connected among the Boko Haram terrorist group leadership. He was and the man believed to have formally introduced Abubakar Shekau to the original founder of Boko Haram terrorists’ group, the late Mohammed Yusuf. Dissatisfied with Shekau’s unforgiven leadership tactics and quest for senseless violence, Nur and Al-Barnawi met with other top commanders and formed a recognised ISIS splinter group called ISWAP. Mamman Nur was at the centre of a bitter and challenging letter titled ‘expose’ responding directly to Shekau’s threats after his replacement and presenting justifications of the ISIS decision to replace Shekau. Shekau refused to back down from leading ISWAP and promised to hunt down Mamman Nur and Al Barnawi.   Mamman Nur became deputy to the Wali Al-Barnawi but in reality, the much experienced and connected deputy was indeed the real Wali. In the later part of 2018, Mamman Nur was killed after internal accusations of embezzlement and leaning towards a more liberal approach. Sources say, Al Barnawi was made to believe, that with Nur out of the way, he would have full command and control of ISWAP. However, while one finger was pointed directly at Mamman Nur, some quick thinking commanders pointed the remaining fingers directly at  Shekau’s past promises of

BORDER SECURITY, DEFENSE, GLOBAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

Africa – A Soft Landing for ISIL [A Proactive Response]

/

UK based Counter Terrorism Expert David Otto, Director of TGS Intelligence Consultants Ltd & Founder of Step In – Step Out (SISO), delivered lectures on Defence Against Terrorism at NATO School Oberammergau Germany. Delivering his lectures, Mr David Otto urged senior military trainees, NCOs and Civilian equivalents from a selected number of NATO States and partner Nations to keep a cautious eye on the changing environment in global jihadist group location, tactics and network with particular reference to the relationship between Daesh in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin , Al Shabaab in East Africa , Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) & Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) amongst others. Otto who is also the Senior Counter Terrorism Advisor for Global Risk International UK LTD maintained that the current Kinetic pressure on Daesh in Raqqa and Mosul by coalition forces will not only result in a ’balloon effect’ displacement, but may likely force desperate ‘Foreign Fighters’ to seek for alternative operating environments in other safe Daesh Wiyalats outside Syria and Iraq. “For the first time since splitting from Al-Qaeda in Iraq Jabhat al- Nusra and the declaration of the so called ‘Caliphate’ by the self-declared Caliph Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi in June 2014. Daesh is experiencing its worst defeat in the hands of the coalition forces in their strongest holds of Mosul and Raqqa. Daesh has three natural options, either fight, flight or freeze. Their fighters are not trained to freeze or surrender. Daesh will continue to engage in Jihad, however in the circumstances, the remaining leadership, will consider relocation, preferably somewhere they have a formidable Wiyalat where they will be able to re-strategies, get resources, recruit, rearm and mount a different strategy not seen before – perhaps the use of Chemical or Biological agents for maximum effect.” On the question of what Jihadist groups could provide Daesh needed support in trouble times like this, Otto said; “Looking at the recent upsurge in Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab attacks against hard and soft targets in Nigeria and Somalia, and the activities of the Maute group & Abu Sayed in the Philippines, there are two possible ways this may play out for Daesh. First, by carrying out multiple and continuous deadly attacks against hard military coalitions, it appears these Daesh Wiyalats are putting themselves forward as alternative ‘Caliphate’ to Mosul and Raqqa. These jihadist groups are showing Daesh leadership their resilience and willingness to continue the global Jihad against the near and far enemy and create a safe space for fleeing jihadist. Alternatively, the current upsurge may be a direct call by Daesh leadership itself to all its Wilayats to carry out deadly and continuous attacks to act as a distraction tactic to coalition forces who are bent on retaking Mosul and Raqqa by all means” Otto Continued “What is certain is that we shall see an increase in disillusioned and blood thirsty foreign fighters returning ‘home’ and either perform Jihad immediately on successful arrival at home soil – like the Manchester Arena bomber, Salman Abedi or become sleeper cells only to strike at unexpected moments with unexpected tactics when directed to do so by what will be left of Daesh leadership command. Other more active Jihadist who find no possibilities of going back home due to high security alert or other practical reasons may embark on joining other wilayats where they can easily blend with the local population and other jihadist to continue their Jihad. As ‘culture eats strategy for breakfast’ What we may not likely see is a ‘white European Jihadist’ from the battle field of Syria or Iraq joining Boko Haram ranks in Northern Nigeria for example. Such a Jihadist may likely find ease joining the likes of AQIM in Algeria or Mali, AQAP in Yemen or Somalia based Al-Shabaab, which provides an environment they may easily blend with lookalike local fighters, as seen in the infamous case of British born Samantha Lewthwaite (White Widow) who joined the Al-Shabaab ranks and allegedly marrying Al -Shabaab terror Chief Sheikh Hassan Maalim”. A global coordinated effort with NATO playing a key role alongside the UN, Interpol, European Union, and Africa Union needs to watch for the influx of Daesh/ISIS fighters making their way to Africa and beyond in need for a “soft landing” and haven. Mr. Otto’s lectures included the models that articulate different types of insurgencies that survive and proliferate throughout Africa and Middle East as well as coordinated anti-terrorism and counterterrorism strategies to effectively combat terrorist motivation, recruitment models, radicalization stages and their identification. Attendees from the seminar had rave reviews for Mr. Otto: “This is exactly what we have been looking for,” said one of the trainees who opted to remain anonymous for security reasons, “where these radicalized fighters are going is where we need to focus our  prevent and intelligence resources and by proactively engaging the local communities that will give them a home, whoever wins the trustfirst, wins the fight, we are in a race of time.” Mr. Otto added, “By integrating sound technology and traditional intelligence collection techniques into the Anti-Terrorism model advocated by SISO, identification, disengaging and deradicalizing these fighters is a manageable process with the right structures and expertise. This is doable now, with minor adjustments to existing strategy. Clearly a different approach is needed, and the timing is right for NATO and other strategic partners to make great strides in applying the techniques and models in this course to effect significant change in the Anti-Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism strategies to get the most desirable results – less insurgency and more long –term peace and stability.” To solve the problem right, you must first solve the right problem.

BORDER SECURITY, COUNTER INSURGENCY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS

UNDERSTANDING THE ZAMFARA SECURITY THREAT

/

SUMMARY Zamfara state is located in the North West region of Nigeria. It has 14 Local Government Areas and a population of approximately 3.8 million people. Zamfara is bordered to the north by Niger Republic, to the south by Kaduna state, to the east by Katsina and to the west by Sokoto and Niger states. Zamfara state’s ethnic majority are Hausas and Herders, while minority ethnic groups include Gwari, Kamuku, Kambari, Dukawa, Busawa and Zabarma. Other ethnic groups found within the state are Igbo, Yoruba, Kanuri, Nupe and Tiv. The main languages spoken in Zamfara state are Hausa, Fulfulde and Arabic. The predominant occupation of the people is Agriculture with 80% of the population engaged in agricultural activities. Zamfara has a high level of poverty with over 70.8% poverty rating. Zamfara has been plagued with security challenges which has grown incessantly worse over time. Hoodlum attacks, banditry and cattle rustling are major challenges they deal with. The porous border with Niger Republic has exposed Zamfara state to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. High levels of unemployment and uneducated youth with nothing to do, has encouraged the formation of criminal gangs with easy access to arms. While the vast land expanse and deep forests have provided safe havens for criminal gangs who raid villages, kill citizens, rustle cattle, kidnap for ransom and attack travelers on the highway. Much of the insecurity has been tackled by vigilante groups and hunters. Policemen and soldiers are often attacked and killed. The local law enforcement frequently report arrests of criminals, but not much is known about what happens there after. DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES In February 2018, the Zamfara state governor stated that with a population of over 4 million, the were only 2,000 policemen, 315 soldiers, 400 mobile policemen and less than 100 air force personnel. Although, these numbers are likely to have increased in recent times. As at 1 April 2019, the Nigerian Army launched ‘Exercise Harbin Kunama IV’ focused on tackling the armed bandits and insurgent groups from identified forest areas and strongholds in Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara States. Heretofore, much of the defense related activities reported were Nigerian Airforce deploying air assets to launch airstrike on suspected bandit hideouts in the forests. The vastly ungoverned spaces and the forests provide major cover and protection for criminals in the state. While these may have been tactically successful, they have not been strategically successful in stemming the menace. Troops deployed to Zamfara experience direct small arms fire from the criminal groups. The criminal groups frequently patrol the communities and ask the locals questions about the capabilities, strength size, leadership and TTPs of the troops assigned to the area. The police in the area have been known to flee either at the onset or during intense attacks. One key complaint given by troops operating in the area, is the mode of transportation used by the bandits. The bandits utilize fast motorcycles which allow for easy maneuver evasion and escape, whereas, the troops have to utilize pick-up trucks and MRAPs which are comparatively inflexible. Another issue has to do with the delays and push backs they receive when requesting airstrikes on known enemy location. Those requests are often met with bureaucratic paperwork processes detrimental to successfully tactical operations. In the case of close air support, the response often comes too late (up to 1.5hrs after initial request in some cases). BANDITRY AND KIDNAPPING THREAT Banditry and kidnapping are the two main security threats and concern in Zamfara today. Farming and herding communities in Zamfara and the wider region have long been terrorised by gangs who raid villages, stealing cattle and kidnapping residents for ransom. Zamfara is largely an ungoverned space and in response to the incessant insecurity, residents began forming and hiring local vigilante groups to confront the armed criminal groups. This development has given rise to the recent increase in violent incidents, as accusations of extrajudicial killings of suspected bandits have arisen. In addition, the criminal groups have begun conducting reprisal attacks against the vigilante groups to avenge the death of their members. According to reports[1], villagers would rather vigilante groups are disbanded because the communities with them are usually on the receiving end of vicious reprisal attacks by the bandits. The poor governance in the state has exacerbated illegal gold mining in which many of the criminal gangs operating in the region have links to. However, gold mining communities are also frequently targeted. In a reported incident approx. 50 bandits cordoned off the area, robbed the mines, demanding for gold and other precious stones from the miners. Figure 2 Zamfara illegal gold mining operations are large scale with some reports indicating that security personnel have on occasion been found providing static security for the mines. A recent report from Ahmad Salkida which reviewed information gathered from interviews with community members in Zamfara state paints a picture of a state that is being run by organized criminal syndicates: You will see them (the armed bandits) in broad daylight brandishing their AK 47 rifles. In some communities, they move freely, demanding of the villagers to mind their business, while they (bandits) mind theirs. Some members of the community even approach the bandits to settle their disputes. The bandits lord it over these territories with 100% control. The only difference between them and Boko Haram is that they do not govern or administer Sharia. Some of these communities are mostly in Zamfara north. In Birnin Magaji, there is a village like Gidan Kasso and Dumburu, close to Niger Republic that are completely subject to the bandits. But as at today, there is no part of Zamfara state that is not affected by either armed banditry or kidnap for ransom”[1] Many believe the attackers are Fulanis from both Niger Republic as well as Nigeria. Interestingly, their targets are also local Fulani cattle-rearers who have no means of protecting themselves. The motivation for these Zamfara attacks is primarily pecuniary. Attacks initially focused on stealing cattle

Scroll to Top