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CRIME, CURATED OSINT, INTELLIGENCE, Nigeria, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

UNMASKING THE COMPLEXITIES OF BANK ROBBERIES IN NIGERIA: TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND SECURITY MEASURES

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Introduction In recent years, bank robberies have emerged as a persistent security concern in Nigeria, leaving behind a trail of substantial financial losses, loss of lives, and enduring trauma in the affected communities. The landscape of bank robberies in Nigeria has undergone a notable transformation. Initially, these events were typified by armed criminals boldly infiltrating banks in broad daylight, relying on sheer force to intimidate bank personnel and patrons, and departing with substantial sums of money. On October 20, Otukpo, a town in Benue State, bore witness to a daring bank robbery. This audacious act targeted four banks within the town, sending shockwaves throughout the community. The armed robbers entered these banking institutions, brandishing firearms that struck fear into the hearts of all present. As the robbers began discharging their weapons, shattering glass, and sowing chaos, a state of panic ensued, prompting people, both bank clients and staff, to seek refuge. Robbers stormed four commercial banks killing many in Otukpo Benue State. Image source: Premium Times Trends in Nigeria The years spanning from 2020 to 2023 exposed a disconcerting pattern of criminal activities associated with bank robberies in Nigeria. During this timeframe, several distinctive trends emerged, offering insights into the changing landscape of these incidents: Selective Targets: Commercial banks located in urban and semi-urban areas became the prime focus of these criminal activities. The rationale behind this was the potential for more substantial financial gains, making these institutions attractive targets. Violence Escalation: Bank robbery incidents frequently escalated into violent confrontations. Perpetrators employed a combination of force and intimidation to achieve their objectives, leading to unfortunate casualties among police personnel and innocent civilians. Heightened Sophistication: Criminals began employing increasingly sophisticated tactics in their endeavours. This involved measures like disabling surveillance systems to avoid detection and arrest, further complicating law enforcement efforts. Collaborative Criminal Networks: A noticeable development was the emergence of criminal networks and collaborations. This made it more challenging for law enforcement agencies to combat these crimes, as criminals shared information, tactics, and resources, effectively complicating the security landscape. Nationwide Impact: Bank robberies were not restricted to a specific locality but rather had a nationwide footprint. States in north-central, south-west, and south-south Nigeria have experienced a notable number of incidents over the years. Prosecution Predicaments: Successful prosecution of suspects remained a significant challenge. Issues related to evidence collection, witness protection, and the legal process collectively hampered efforts in this regard. Challenges Faced in Navigating the Complex Landscape The issue of bank robberies in Nigeria is further compounded by several critical challenges. Among them, a prominent concern is the inadequate investment in security infrastructure and personnel training. Many banks rely on antiquated security systems that are ill-prepared to combat the ever-evolving tactics employed by contemporary criminals. Additionally, the limited collaboration between security agencies and financial institutions impedes the seamless exchange of crucial intelligence and information necessary for proactive prevention. Ineffective law enforcement capabilities present yet another formidable hurdle. The culprits often evade justice due to resource constraints, a lack of training, and a shortage of investigative expertise within Nigerian law enforcement agencies. This absence of accountability has, regrettably, emboldened criminals, leading to an unrelenting cycle of rising crime rates. Socio-economic Impacts The impact of bank robberies on Nigerian society runs deep, leaving lasting impressions and significant consequences. It goes beyond the immediate financial losses experienced by the banks. The trauma endured by victims and the wider community is immeasurable. These robberies often lead to casualties, not just among bank employees but also innocent customers and in some cases, bystanders. The violence and fear associated with such encounters create enduring emotional wounds, affecting not only those directly involved but also witnesses who bear witness to these terrifying incidents. This emotional distress can cast a lingering shadow over the affected communities, eroding their sense of safety and well-being. On an economic front, the ramifications are equally substantial. Bank robberies can disrupt local businesses particularly if the targeted banks are central to the financial transactions within the community. Additionally, the expenses incurred in rebuilding and enhancing security measures can place financial burdens on both the banks and the broader society. Mitigation Measures Using a Holistic Security Approach Addressing the intricate challenge of bank robberies in Nigeria necessitates a comprehensive strategy encompassing both preemptive and responsive actions. The following recommendations aim to fortify security: Modernized Security Infrastructure: A foremost consideration is the imperative need for Nigerian banks to allocate resources towards enhancing their security infrastructure. This involves adopting state-of-the-art surveillance, access control, and alarm systems capable of effectively countering contemporary criminal strategies. Training and Awareness: A robust training regimen for bank personnel should be an ongoing commitment aimed at augmenting their capacity to identify and respond to potential threats. Simultaneously, empowering customers through education can foster increased vigilance, reinforcing the security fabric. Strengthened Collaborative Frameworks: Enhanced cooperation between banks, law enforcement agencies, and security firms is pivotal. Establishing an efficient platform for information exchange can expedite intelligence dissemination, resulting in more prompt and targeted threat responses. Legal Revisions: Advocating for stricter penalties concerning bank robbery and cybercrime is a critical measure. The augmentation of the legal framework and the expeditious prosecution of culprits can serve as potent deterrents. Community Participation: Actively involving local communities in the battle against bank robberies has proven to be exceptionally effective. Initiatives such as community policing, neighbourhood watch programmes, and public awareness campaigns all contribute to a reduction in incidents. Cybersecurity Vigilance: Given the growing role of cyberattacks in the realm of bank robberies, financial institutions should allocate resources to implement robust cybersecurity measures. The employment of cybersecurity experts to safeguard digital assets is paramount. Conclusion The surge in bank robbery incidents within Nigeria from 2020 to 2023 serves as a compelling reminder of the pressing need for comprehensive security reforms. The evolving patterns, characterized by an uptick in occurrences, heightened tactical ingenuity, and a wider geographical reach, present a formidable challenge. Yet, the existing hurdles, which include outdated security infrastructure and the inadequacy of law enforcement capabilities, only

CORRUPTION, CRIME, Nigeria, Reports

ILLEGAL OIL REFINING IN NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION Crude oil, one of the main sources of energy supply worldwide, was discovered in Nigeria in 1956. The first commercial oil well was drilled in Oloibiri, a town located in Bayelsa state, in the Niger Delta.  The country as of today has a total of 10 leading oil-producing states across the six geopolitical zones. Owing to the fast-rising growth in the oil sector, there have been irregularities in its production and like every facet of a country’s economy, exploitation has taken the form of illegal oil refineries predominantly in the Niger Delta. CONTEXT Illegal oil refineries commonly referred to as bunkering in Nigeria encompass all acts involving oil theft, including diversion and smuggling of oil and unauthorised loading of ships. A typical process of accessing the oil involves puncturing an existing oil pipeline at night and establishing a tapping point from which operations are done. The effects of bunkering have led to several risks ranging from economic, political, and environmental due to oil spillage and explosions to security risks ranging from armed robbery and civil unrest owing to clashes between indigenes and illegal operators. Additionally, no fewer than 285 persons have lost their lives to explosions from illegal refineries and tanker explosions from January 2021 to date. On October 3 at least 37 people were burnt to death after an explosion in an illegal oil refinery in iIbas Community, Emuoha Local Government Area of River State. Although popular opinion attributes the causes of illegal refineries to poverty and low living standards, it is largely carried out by militants in the operating areas. HIGHLIGHTS ON SECURITY OPERATIONS Security threats posed by the operation of illegal refineries cannot be overemphasized as they leave irreversible consequences in the affected areas. In a bid to regulate oil production in the country and to eradicate illegal activities, Government Security Forces (GSF) have sprung into action to cripple these operations through raids and swoops. Reports reveal that cumulatively from 2015 to 2023, at least 5,840 illegal refining sites were deactivated by security forces. Recently, Troops of the Nigerian Army destroyed an illegal oil refinery in Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State on August 23, 8 active ovens used for illegal refining of stolen crude oil, and 14 storage reservoirs containing stolen crude oil estimated at 200, 000 litres and 90, 000 litres of locally refined Automotive Gas Oil were destroyed during the operation. In September, the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) reported that troops of Operation Delta Safe, in 2 weeks, had uncovered and destroyed 89 illegal refining sites in the Niger Delta region. 21 dugout pits, 56 boats, 138 storage tanks, 235 cooking ovens, six pumping machines, one outboard engine, and two speedboats were discovered and destroyed while about 1.2 litres of stolen crude oil, 452,910 litres of illegally refined Automotive Gas Oil and 22,650 litres of Premium Motor Spirit were recovered from the operations. CONCLUSION The downside of illegal refinery operations, beyond the obvious environmental risks which are irredeemable, is the security threats they pose in the communities where these operations are done. These are but not limited to recurrent clashes by opposing communities encountering pollution, raids by security forces rendering the community in a state of unrest and the influx of militants in the affected communities.

CRIME, Nigeria, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

NIGERIA’S KIDNAP CRISIS: A PERSISTENT CHALLENGE

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Introduction Kidnapping has become a pervasive and alarming issue in Nigeria, posing a significant threat to both national security and the safety of its citizens. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, has long grappled with security challenges. While insurgency by groups like Boko Haram and communal conflicts have been significant concerns, the surge in kidnapping incidents has added a new layer of complexity to the nation’s security woes. Kidnapping has grown into a multi-faceted problem, affecting all regions of the country to varying degrees. Motivations Behind Kidnappings Kidnapping incidents in Nigeria are driven by a mix of economic, political, and social factors. This includes economic desperation and financial gain. High unemployment rates, poverty, and income inequality have pushed individuals towards criminal activities like kidnapping as a means of survival. Furthermore, criminal gangs and militias resort to kidnapping for ransom as a lucrative source of income. Victims, often targeted based on perceived affluence, are held captive until their families pay a substantial ransom. Weak Law Enforcement and Judicial System A lack of effective law enforcement and corruption within the security scene and judicial system has allowed kidnapping to thrive. Kidnappers often operate with impunity, and cases are frequently mishandled or go uninvestigated. Also, the lack of cooperation between security bodies has made sharing of intelligence difficult. The trend of Kidnap incidents from April to September 2023 (Q2 -Q3) Data Source: Bulwark Intelligence Database. The above line chart shows an estimated number of kidnapped victims from March – September of Q2 and Q3 of 2023. Analysis shows the North Central region recorded the highest number of kidnap victims in April while the North West region recorded the highest number of kidnapped victims from May through September. In Quarter 2 at least 528 people were kidnapped and an estimated 396 people were kidnapped in Quarter 3. However, the last Quarter is likely to see a rise in kidnap cases. This may not be unrelated to the upcoming festive period where crime rates are likely to increase. It should be noted that due to the problem of underreporting, some incidents may have been missed hence, the data used for the visualization and the statistics is an estimated number. Noteworthy kidnap incidents that occurred across the country in September 2023 19 people including a Seminarian were kidnapped by armed men in Sabon Kawu, Bwari Area Council, Abuja on 8 September. An estimated 50 locals were kidnapped by bandits who ambushed vehicles en route to Bagega village along the Anka-Baggega Road near Darita Forest, Anka LGA, Zamfartravelersn 9 September. 30 people were reportedly kidnapped by bandits who attacked farmland in Giyawa, Goronyo LGA, Sokoto State on 14 September. Approximately 14 travellers were kidnapped on 15 September by suspected Indigenous People of Biafra-Eastern Security Network (IPOB-ESN) members along Enugu-Nsukka Road, Opi, Nsukka LGA, Enugu State. On 22 September, more than 24 Federal University students were kidnapped by bandits from the Local campus accommodation, located in Sabon Gida village, Gusau LGA, Zamfara State. On 29 September, 25 people were kidnapped between Ipele junction and Ifon in the Ose Local Government Area of Ondo State. Conclusion Kidnapping in Nigeria represents a complex security challenge driven by a combination of economic, social, and political factors. Tackling this issue requires a multifaceted approach, including law enforcement reforms, economic empowerment, public awareness campaigns, and regional cooperation. With concerted efforts and a commitment to addressing the root causes, Nigeria can hope to reduce the incidence of kidnapping and enhance its security landscape.  

CRIME, CURATED OSINT, INTELLIGENCE, Nigeria, Reports, SECURITY THREATS, Travel

ATTACK ON UNITED STATES EMBASSY STAFF IN ANAMBRA STATE, NIGERIA.

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  Overview On Tuesday, May 16, an attack took place in the Amiyi/Eke Ochuche communities of Ogbaru Local Government Area, Anambra State, resulting in the death of four staff members of the United States Embassy in Nigeria. The attackers also set the bodies of the victims and their vehicles ablaze before fleeing the scene. The incident occurred during a medical outreach program, where residents were waiting to receive medical treatment from UNICEF officials when their vehicle was ambushed. Current Situation Attack Details: The assailants targeted the convoy of U.S. Consulate staff along the Atani-Osamale road. Two Police Mobile Force operatives and two staff members of the Consulate were killed in the attack. The attackers abducted two police operatives and the driver of the second vehicle.  Rescue/Recovery Operation: Joint security forces have launched a rescue/recovery operation in Ogbaru LGA to locate the perpetrators and apprehend them. The operation aims to ensure the safe recovery of any abducted individuals and restore security in the area. Security Forecast/Outlook Potential for Escalation: The attack on the United States Embassy staff highlights the potential for further acts of violence by extremist groups or criminal elements seeking to disrupt diplomatic activities and undermine security in the region. There is a possibility of retaliation or subsequent attacks targeting similar vulnerable targets. Response and Recommendations Heightened Security Measures: Embassies and Humanitarian outfits should review and enhance security protocols for its staff and facilities in Nigeria, considering the current threat landscape. This includes conducting regular risk assessments, implementing robust access control measures, and strengthening security training and awareness programs. Communication and Coordination: Improved communication and coordination between diplomatic missions, Nigerian authorities, and local security forces are essential to prevent such attacks and enhance security for all personnel involved in humanitarian missions. Situational Awareness: Diplomatic and Humanitarian Staff members should be reminded to maintain a high level of situational awareness, closely monitoring their surroundings and reporting any suspicious activities or individuals to local authorities and diplomatic or organization security department. Travel Security: Adequate travel security measures should be implemented, including pre-travel risk assessments, appropriate security escorts or support, and adherence to established travel protocols, especially in high-risk areas. Incident Response and Crisis Management: The Embassy should ensure that staff members are well-informed about incident response and crisis management procedures. Regular drills and training sessions can enhance their readiness to handle potential security incidents effectively. Conclusion The attack on United States Embassy staff in Anambra State highlights the importance of maintaining robust security measures and close collaboration with Nigerian authorities. The Embassy should continue working closely with local law enforcement agencies to bring the perpetrators to justice and prevent future incidents. Implementing the recommended security measures will help mitigate risks, safeguard the well-being of Embassy staff, and ensure the success of any humanitarian mission in Nigeria. The incident serves as a reminder for the public to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activities to the appropriate authorities. Heightened public awareness and engagement can act as a force multiplier in maintaining security and detecting potential threats.

CURATED OSINT, CYBER SECURITY, GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS, Nigeria, POLITICS, Reports

NIGERIA’S 2023 ELECTIONS AND SUSTAINED ONLINE POLITICAL FANATICISM: ACHIEVING POLITICAL CORRECTNESS.

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Background The increasing need for change in the country has manifested in all facets of our society, and the just concluded general elections was a testament to this change, marred by instance’s of irregularities, political participation has largely taken the shape of “sheep following” or “herd following.” With the internet being a major tool for driving the evolution of youth political participation in Nigeria politics, so have the vices that come with it. As Oluwasola Festus Obisesan puts it, “Youths, through the use of social media, have not only evolved from an identity of stable consumers of news and political narratives but have also become sources of news feeds and trendy agenda framers concerning leadership, accountability, and good governance within the polity.” Misinformation ???? https://t.co/zlRiWWQMlu — Attah Jesse (@JesseAOA) February 9, 2023 This evolution and enthusiasm for political participation have witnessed an ugly trend of cyberbullying and propaganda, driven by identity politics, which continues to shape the perception and opinions of many Nigerians. With less and less objectivity, we continue to witness less democratic attitudes amongst partisans but more sensationalism with an ounce of conspiracy theory bandwagoning. Why is political fanaticism growing in popularity now? To begin with, the pre-election session witnessed an unusual and highly charged political atmosphere, with much anticipation of a new dawn in Nigerian politics. Among other things, the process was marred by various forms of armed violence, allegations of state-sponsored stifling of opposition activities, and cyberbullying. As we all know, technology was one of many key factors that grow the populations involvement in the 2023 electioneering process, with the introduction of Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) for the accreditation process, which also doubles down as a means for the transmission of results to the Independent Electoral Election Commission (INEC) Result Viewing Portal (IREV). Yet, the fact that agreed-upon transmission processes were not followed or were suspended midway during the election, breached the trust of many Nigerians at a critical time of the process, and hence increased suspicions of malpractice and other forms assumptions within the political environment already overridden by all sorts of political and election propaganda. The country’s current situation is exacerbated by reduced expectations of the trustworthiness of INEC procedures and perceived complicity of the country’s judiciary, in that, seeking redress may be met by irregularities in the courts’ due to allegations of political pressure to influence the process. There is also a dangerous rise in radical political fanaticism against the backdrop of increased ethnic violence, cyberbullying, propaganda (misinformation and disinformation campaigns), and the possibility of deteriorating human rights, which will dramatically impact the nation’s polity, hence, putting the president-elect and his new democratic cabinet in a predicament of governing a fractured nation with multifaceted political concerns. What is political fanaticism? In Nigeria, political fanaticism has largely been described as “sheep following” or “herd following,” in which adherents lack any sense of personal opinions that could form the basis of a critique in checking the actions of government or political leaders but rather agree with whatever decisions are made regardless of the outcome, good or bad. This is generally observed when party supporters push a candidate as the final answer to a country’s multifarious issues, such as the ones faced in Nigeria, while others (read: candidates) are eventually viewed as inept and incorrect. Characteristics of fanaticism among partisans frequently includes the incapacity to seek or consider alternate points of view but try to push values on others, often resulting in physical and verbal harassment of persons. Political fanaticism may frequently rise to varying degrees of political radicalism, and in a society kept together by fragile peace and a high proclivity for violence, especially when played out along Nigeria’s fault lines of tribe and religion, it creates mediums that lead to political extremism. Political extremism is common among groups that proclaim unrealistic expectations in order to attain political aspirations without crafting well-thought-out democratic plans. This has frequently resulted in groups picking up arms and embracing terrorism as a mode of operation for coercing governments into forced discussions, which has resulted in a protracted conflict in Nigeria in circumstances when governments have refused to succumb to such groups. Is online political fanaticism new in Nigeria? 2022/23 will not be the first time we observe a rise in cyberbullying, in relation to political party support. Intriguingly, harmful internet engagement in Nigerian elections may be traced back to 2014, the pre-election year preceding the 2015 General Elections. During this period, intense internet clashes erupted between the then-ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). Yet, it is worth noting that there were some opportunities to establish the groundwork for healthy (read: issue-based) constructive criticism. For instance, upon registration of the APC on July 31, 2013, the PDP’s congratulatory message described the party’s emergence as “very healthy for our democracy.” This again was conveyed in a congratulatory message after the election of its National Executives on June 14, 2014. The message read in part, “Ensure an issue-based opposition that will purposefully and constructively engage and challenge the PDP with decency and maturity as prescribed by democratic tenets and principles.” However, during the campaigning period for the 2015 General Elections, these expectations significantly fell short of expectations and were instead championed by the rhetoric of division over national interest, adopting varying forms of propagandistic prowess. The two main parties’ antecedents in terms of online propaganda and its incubation of an army of trolls will continue to be a benchmark of how campaigns will run, which has continued to usher in violence, hate speech, and the exploitation of Nigerian fault lines all for the sake of partisan interest over national interest, as depicted in 2019 and worse in 2022/23. As the popular saying goes, “If you can’t beat them. Join them” Overtime we have seen political fanaticism only get dangerous, making the political environment extremely toxic to the point where certain actors accommodate attacks particularly when it aligns with certain political bias. Remember the Abuja Train

CYBER SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, Nigeria, POLITICS, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

CYBER SECURITY THREATS TO THE 2023 ELECTIONS

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Most Nigerians are already tired of the elections, and it’s not even here yet. That being said, everyone is looking forward to election day so that we can all move on, and Naira can begin flowing again. But insecurity is one of those dreadful phenomena that could lead to INEC postponing the elections. There is a joint civil society group that meets regularly to evaluate election security and they are known as the Inter-agency Consultative Committee on Electoral Security (ICCES). A few months ago, the ICCES conducted an assessment and revealed that there were about 686 communities across Nigeria with high insecurity levels due to the activities of various Armed Non-State Actors, which were going to pose a problem for INEC effectively delivering election materials and eventually holding the elections in those areas. About 90% of those communities were based up north. Half of those were in the North West region alone, particularly in Zamfara state which has been hard hit by proscribed bandit groups considered as terrorists. The North Central also recorded a high chunk of insecure communities, as well as the South East particularly Imo, Anambra and Abia. The Bulwark Intelligence map below indicates areas that we are projecting will report levels of electoral attacks. Bulwark came up with their assessments using data from locations that have already reported significant pre-electoral violence, and also states that will likely show tension following the announcement of the election results. Despite the physical security threats, INEC insists that it is still going to go forward with the elections, and security agencies say they are going to do everything they can to prevent any form of violence on that day. CYBER SECURITY THREATS TO NIGERIA’S ELECTIONS The Electoral Act of 2022, ushered in the era of digitization for INEC. The reason is simple. The manual process was leading to significant interference and preventing a truly free and fair election. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) are supposed to help eliminate these risks. If all goes well, the issue of ballot stuffing, ballot snatching, results collation tampering, and voter fraud should be significantly reduced. But with increased dependence on technology, comes the requisite cyber security threats to INEC. The electoral commission mentioned that during the 2022 Ekiti and Osun elections, their portal experienced “significant cyber-attacks. But thankfully their engineers and cyber security teams were able to effectively respond”. There are interference threats of Disinformation and misinformation campaigns which are designed to influence the individual voter’s decision-making process, through intentional and unintentional dissemination of false information. There are also threats associated with deep fake videos which are doctored voiceover videos. This is particularly scary in places like Nigeria where wrong comments about tribe and religion could lead to physical violence and destruction. CYBER ATTACK THREATS ON INEC PORTALS AND TOOLS There are four notable tech portals and tools INEC has been using in these elections. There’s Basic Security in Election Duties (BaSED), an online security training portal for INEC personnel which allows INEC to train their over 1 million staff and ad-hoc personnel on election security awareness and what to do in case of security incidents. The other is the Election Logistics Management System (ELMS) which is an app INEC is using to track election materials procurement from storage to delivery. We’re talking about the movement of election materials to over 176,000 polling units across the country, which will be done using over 100,000 vehicles, and 4,200 boats escorted by the Navy. As you can imagine, the use of tech for logistics management is also a welcome development. The two external facing tools which have a high risk of cyber-attacks are BVAS and IReV. The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) helps ensure the voter is who he says he is. The upside is that it will reduce voter fraud and double dipping. But the downside is the biometric devices can act up causing delays and false negative errors which could prevent legitimate voters from being verified. The recently conducted BVAS mock testing and accreditation exercise revealed challenges with the internet network/server which is required for activation and configuration. Some remote locations experienced delays as a result. There were some reports of faulty BVAS devices. The hardware was faulty, and the fingerprint scanners were not working properly. INEC is also using the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), which is supposed to ensure electronic transmission and viewing of results in near real-time. This is supposed to prevent cases of false results during collation or inconclusive results following interference by thugs at the polling unit. Again, the downside is going to be the internet network and the ability to upload the results. In addition, the availability of qualified personnel might be a challenge. INEC mentioned that during the Ekiti and Osun elections, there were cases of low-quality uploads because the officers who had been trained to do these uploads were not available or had to be substituted with others who had not been adequately trained for that role. INEC says they will ensure this doesn’t happen again, by deploying only adequately trained officers. SOLUTIONS It’s a little too late to advise on solutions right now since it’s almost game time. But one can only hope that INEC has already done significant levels of preparedness, especially in their ability to effectively detect attacks, respond to these attacks and quickly recover from the said attacks. Hopefully, they’ve conducted penetration tests and allowed independent ethical hackers to rigorously poke for vulnerabilities. PERSONAL SECURITY TIPS To be realistic, we are going to experience some levels of electoral violence, regardless of who wins or how many security agents are deployed to the streets. There are going to be paid thugs standing by to do the bidding of their political paymaster. There will be cases of voter intimidation, where people will be threatened to vote a specific way or experience the wrath of their local warlord. People are going to be upset with

INTELLIGENCE, Lifestyle, Nigeria, Reports

VIP PROTECTION BEST PRACTICE AND LESSONS FOR NIGERIAN POLICE ARMED ESCORT

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Introduction According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, NST, a project of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Africa programme that tracks and maps violence in Nigeria, no fewer than 8,058 lives were cut short violently across Nigeria in 2022. Specifically, no fewer than 138 policemen were killed across Nigeria in the last eight months – January to August, 2022. ‘’States with the highest number of policemen killed within this period are Niger with 24, Enugu with 18, Anambra with 13, Imo 12, Borno and Kogi with nine each. Others include Delta and Kastina with 7 each, Kebbi with 5, Ebonyi and Benue with 4, Cross River, Edo, Oyo, Taraba with 3 each, Jigawa, Rivers, Bayelsa and Ondo with 2 each, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Kwara, Lagos, Osun and the FCT with 1 each’’. The unrelenting and unfolding security challenges in Nigeria seem to have boosted the demand for armed protection services, close or VIP protection, with attendant up-tick in the sale of armoured, bullet proof, reinforced, or treated vehicles. Perhaps this is why Senator Shehu Sani describes bullet-proof vehicles ‘’as a major lifeline in the face of rising insecurity in Nigeria’’. Report by Punch Newspaper, September 26, 2022, shows that as preparations for the 2023 general elections gain momentum and amidst worsening insecurity across the country, the demand for bullet-proof Sports Utility Vehicles in Nigeria have increased significantly. According to Colonel Hassan Stan-Labo (retd.), ‘’politicians were rushing to purchase bullet-proof vehicles because they are very vulnerable, having failed to use public resources judiciously’’. Recall that the use of bullet proof vehicles in Nigeria is regulated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). This means that an end user certificate (EUC) is needed and granted to private individuals who provide evidence of threat to their lives. Again, like many paper-tiger stipulations in Nigeria, aforesaid is far from been a hard-and-fast rule. On armed protection and escort It is not unusual to see nouveau-riches, high-net worth individuals (HNWI) having scores of armed policemen, government security forces (GSF) in their escort team. The more armed security escort one can muster in Nigeria suggests how moneyed or connected the individual is. Granted deployment of armed security protection is supposed to offer some confidence or deterrent but in practice, it provides no guarantee and cannot forestall targeted, surprise attack by determined criminals. All the assailants need to do is, lay an ambush and launch a kamikaze attack at say, a bad portion of the road where vehicles must slow down. In this analysis, I will zero in on policemen and some GSF killed especially during an ambush while providing armed escort to high-net worth individuals (HNWI).   Between Friday, January 6 and Sunday, January 09, 2023, seven personnel of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (possibly comprising police, soldiers as well as members of vigilantes) were killed during an ambush while escorting an expatriate to a mining site in Birnin Gwari area of Kaduna state. On Monday, January 02, 2023, a driver and four police orderlies were killed as the convoy of a former governor of Imo state and an APC leader, Chief Ikedi Ohakim was attacked by gunmen at Umualumoke, Oriagu in Ehime Mbano LGA of Imo state. Ohakim escaped death by the hair’s breadth because he was in a bulletproof vehicle with two of his children while his security details were tenably in an open Hilux truck. A similar scenario played out when Senator Ifeanyi Ubah was attacked at Enugwukwu, Njikoka LGA of Anambra on Sunday, September 11, 2022. Five of his police escort in addition to other aides were killed. Ubah escaped because he was ensconced in his bullet proof vehicle.  Armed assailants on December 22, 2022, reportedly attacked a vehicle carrying two Chinese contractors and their police escort while en route to Maradun LGA, Zamfara State. One of the Chinese nationals was reportedly killed and another wounded in the ambush Seven persons, including three policemen were on Friday, October 21, 2022, killed when suspected assassins attacked the convoy of the General Overseer of Omega Fire Ministries International, Apostle Johnson Suleiman along the Benin-Auchi expressway in Edo State. Apostle Suleman, his wife, and children were unscathed because they were reportedly in his treated Sports Utility Vehicle when the attack occurred. After his close shave, Suleman was reported to have said, ”if I had the money, I would buy bulletproof cars for every member in this church”. Why not ‘anointing oil’ or handkerchief? That’s by the way. Three police officers who were on escort duty in Port Harcourt on Thursday, November 24, 2022 were shot dead at Rumuokoro flyover when gunmen kidnapped their victim, an oil executive and carted away valuables with an undisclosed amount of money. On Tuesday, July 5, 2022, gunmen attacked the advance team of President Muhammadu Buhari near Dutsinma, on their way to Daura, Katsina State. Two persons in the convoy are receiving treatment for the minor injuries they suffered. Two police orderlies of the Enugu State Commissioner for Lands, Chidi Aroh, were on Sunday, February 22, 2022, killed when gunmen ambushed their Hilux van along Ukpo-Nimo Road, Anambra State. The commissioner reportedly escaped in his SUV. One of the policemen escorting Chinese expatriates was on Wednesday, June 16, 2021, killed as gunmen abducted four Chinese expatriates working on the Lagos-Ibadan railway project. Prior to his emergence as governor, gunmen at Isuofia, in Aguata LGA of Anambra State on Wednesday 31, 2021, attacked the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Prof. Charles Soludo, killing three of his escorts and kidnapped a Commissioner. Aforesaid instances are evidence of government security forces killed while escorting VIPs. Regrettably, very meagre financial compensation are paid to the next-of-kin of diseased personnel who pay the supreme price after unending paper-work, bureaucracy that could take several months. For instance, as part of a welfare insurance scheme for police officers who died in active service, on Tuesday, January 10, 2022, Nigerian Police authorities presented a cheque of N43.2 million to families of

CYBER SECURITY, GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS, Nigeria, POLITICS, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

ELECTION SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS: HYBRID THREATS, EARLY WARNING SIGNS AND PROSPECTS OF A SEAMLESS POLITICAL TRANSITION IN NIGERIA – PART 3

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Political Intolerance And The Risk of Election Violence in Nigeria The National Security Adviser (NSA), Babagana Monguno on Friday, November 11, 2022, stated that “rogues” are planning to disrupt the 2023 elections. Monguno said he was aware that in the last month, at least 52 cases of electoral violence were reported across 22 states in the country. Sequel to the NSA’s declaration, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria, Catriona Wendy Campbell Laing stated that, “When people feel intimidated, they can’t get out to vote, the election itself will not be credible, that is why the violence is of great concern”. On this note, she averred that the United Kingdom  will be watching closely any individual who acts violently or incites people through the social media and would not hesitate to impose visa sanction on such individuals. As a matter of fact, on Wednesday, the United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken went ahead to impose visa restrictions in his words, ‘’on specific individuals in Nigeria for undermining the democratic process in a recent Nigerian election’’. According to Blinken, ‘’additional persons who undermine the democratic process in Nigeria—including in the lead-up to, during, and following Nigeria’s 2023 elections—may be found ineligible for U.S. visas under this policy’’. The United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Tuesday, 17 January, 2023, warned Nigeria against violence in this year’s general elections. ‘’While the UN cautioned that if things go wrong in Nigeria, there would be serious consequences for the peace and stability of the entire region; the ECOWAS said if violence occurs in Nigeria, no other nation in the sub-region could accommodate Nigerian refugees’’. In new security advisories independently issued on Thursday, January 19, 2023, Australia, United Kingdom and the European Union, warned their citizens to reconsider their intending visits to Nigeria, avoid all political gatherings and election related sites in the lead up to, during and after the election due to the hostile “security climate” and threats preparatory to the 2023 general elections. Recall that in October 2022, the United States, UK, Canada, Germany, and Bulgaria issued terror alerts, warning their citizens in Nigeria to avoid shopping malls, religious centres, and hotels which they said could be targeted by terrorists. In its final report on the 2019 general election, the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room conservatively estimated that, ”At least, 626 people were killed between the start of the campaign in October 2018 and the final election in March 2019’’. In 2021, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded a 22% increase in the number of organized political violence events in Nigeria. The violence resulted in over 9,900 reported fatalities, nearly a 30% increase compared to 2020. Cybersecurity, Election Hacking And Interference Evidence abound that state-actors and cyber sleuths interfere with the electoral ecosystem. Their interference can range from one or a combination of information operations, disinformation, broadcasting deep-fake videos across social media platforms, to corrupting data, altering voter registration databases hence disentrancing or impeding citizens’ ability to vote, to attempting to tamper with the outcome of vote count, and undermining voters’ confidence on the legitimacy, integrity of an election. With an approximately 80 million Nigerians online, social media plays enormous role in Nigerian political space hence fake news, disinformation is a thriving industry in Nigeria. For instance, a British Broadcasting Corporation investigation discovered that ‘’political parties in Nigeria are secretly paying social media influencers to spread disinformation about their opponents ahead of the 2023 general elections. According to the BBC’s Global Disinformation Team, a politician acknowledged that in addition to dolling out gifts and promising contracts, nay, political appointments, his team paid a social media influencer up to 20 million Naira (about ($45,000; £37,000) for delivering a ‘result’. The modus operandi of their strategists entails planting fabricated stories through other micro-influencers aimed at eliciting emotions and misinforming people. Idayat Hassan, director at the Centre for Democracy and Development, says the activities of these influencers is tantamount to “political interference”. According to her, “It is undermining trust in democracy, undermining trust in the electoral system, and it is instigating conflict“. Election interference is not exclusive to Nigeria. The website of Ghana’s election commission was allegedly hit by a cyber-attack in 2016. The commission said an attempt to put up “fake results” failed. Also, in 2021, the German government warned Russia over a wave of cyberattacks – “combining conventional cyberattacks with disinformation and influence operations” on German politicians. Similarly, in a BBC report of 11 September 2020, tech giant, Microsoft sent word that hackers with ties to Russia, China and Iran targeted US and British political parties and tried to meddle in elections. According to a newly declassified US State Department cable, Russia covertly spent more than $300m since 2014 to try to influence politicians and other officials in more than two dozen countries. Similarly, two Iranian nationals were charged for cyber-enabled disinformation and threat campaign designed to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election. In the just concluded 2022 Kenyan election, reports indicate that about 200 hacking attempts were made on election results, between Thursday, 11th August and Friday 12th August. Thus, it is not surprising that the Chairman of the INEC Boss, Professor Mahmoud Yakubu confirmed sometime in September 2022, that the Commission’s ‘’result viewing portal (IReV) during the gubernatorial elections in Ekiti and Osun states, experienced several cyberattacks from hackers across the world, some of them from Asia’’. I reckon that the risk and threat of election interference will be higher during Nigeria’s forthcoming presidential election. It behooves on the INEC to ramp up its cybersecurity defenses (including elimination of human error) and ensure that critical technological infrastructure such as its servers, the Result Viewing (IReV) web portal and the over 200,000 Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) that would be deployed across the 176,846 polling units across the country, for the 2023 general election, are not compromised by hackers. According to IBM Cyber Security Intelligence Index Report, human error (and I must add,

GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS, Nigeria, POLITICS, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

ELECTION SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS: HYBRID THREATS, EARLY WARNING SIGNS AND PROSPECTS OF A SEAMLESS POLITICAL TRANSITION IN NIGERIA – PART 2

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Chances of seamless, simultaneous elections nationwide Citing anonymous intelligence shared about Nigeria’s election security by concerned civil society actors conversant with the undertaking of the Inter-agency Consultative Committee on Electoral Security (ICCES), THISDAY Newspaper revealed that, ‘the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) may be under constraint to conduct 2023 elections in plausibly over 686 communities under the atrocious activities of armed non-state actors across the federation’’. According to the report, ‘’affected communities and wards cut across 90 local government areas (LGAs) and 18 states of the federation’’. Out of the 686 affected communities, 618 were identified in the north alone with 336 in the Northwest and 200 communities domiciled in Zamfara state. The implication of this is that Zamfara state is currently deemed as the most dangerous state in Nigeria. Similarly, in the Northeast, 168 communities were identified. Gombe is the only state that is comparatively safe in the Northeast while there are about 79 wards in Borno state where elections may not hold. Aforesaid report submits that it would be challenging to hold elections in about 114 wards in North-central Nigeria, largely in Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau. “In Southeastern Nigeria, 55 communities mainly in Abia, Anambra, and Imo state were referenced as red zones. The findings put the number of communities affected in the South-south at three, all located in Rivers State. THISDAY Newspaper report extrapolated that 90.1 per cent of the purported unsafe communities are domiciled in the north alone while 9.09 per cent representing 68 unsafe communities are in southern Nigeria. A purported policy brief by some northern governors to president Buhari, anticipates that elections may not hold in the North West states of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara in 2023, due to growing insecurity. For instance, data collated by Punch Newspaper as at December 18, 2022, estimated that no fewer than 50 offices and facilities of the Independent National Electoral Commission were attacked across 15 states in the past 4 years. However, data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), suggests aforesaid data might be a conservative estimate. According to ACLED’s December 2022 data, ‘’there have been more than 100 attacks associated with elections since the last elections in 2019’’. No fewer than 67 of such attacks were recorded on non-election days between January 2019 and December 2022. Gunmen on Monday, November 28, 2022, killed the women leader of the Labour Party (LP) in Kaura LGA of Kaduna State, Mrs. Victoria Chintex at her residence in Kaura, Kaduna. Suspected thugs on Monday, October 17, 2022, disrupted the campaign train of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Kaduna State. The campaign convoy of the presidential candidate of the PDP, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, was reportedly attacked in Maiduguri, Borno state, on November 9, 2022. States With High Risk of Election Manipulation, Voter Suppression An “Election Manipulation Risk Index EMRI”, a triangulated data developed by the International Press Centre and eight other organizations including Partners for Electoral Reform, The Albino Foundation, The Kukah Centre, Enough is Enough, Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development, SBM Intelligence, Dataphyte and YIAGA Africa, classified 22 states out of the 36 states in Nigeria as ‘’high risk’’ as it pertains to election manipulation. The states include Imo, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Lagos, Oyo, and Osun. Others are Ekiti, Kwara, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Jigawa states. According to the EMRI report, 12 states with medium election manipulation risks include Borno, Yobe, Nasarawa, Benue, Kogi, Zamfara, Kebbi, Ogun, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa and Cross River while three states: Gombe, Ondo, and the Federal Capital Territory FCT, were classified as low risk. The EMRI report identifies indicators such as voter suppression, resistance against electoral technology like BVAS and IReV, political interference with INEC operations, administrative lapses, tampering with the voter register, and frivolous election litigations, as electoral risks that may potentially impugn the election integrity of the 2023 elections. Election Violence Heat Map: States To Watch Out For The situation in Lagos state pre, during and after the election promises to be dicey, unpredictable. Perhaps as a sign of things to come, the Campaign train of the Governorship Candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party – PDP in Lagos State, Dr. Abdulazeez Olajide Adediran (JANDOR) was reportedly attacked on Sunday, 23rd October, 2022 while his entourage were returning from a visitation to members of the party at the Ikoga Junction area of Badagry LGA. Similarly, on Tuesday, January 24, 2023, thugs attacked the convoy of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governorship candidate in Lagos state, Abdul-Azeez Adediran (Jandor) in Kosofe LGA, stabbing a security officer. Also, Nollywood actress and PDP deputy governorship candidate in Lagos State Funke Akindele was on Tuesday, January 24, 2023, reportedly chased out of the Ikosi fruit market in Lagos by suspected thugs while campaigning. Supporters and thugs loyal to the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) reportedly clashed and shot sporadically in the Aguda area of Surulere, Lagos, on Friday, January 27, 2023. Plausible election suppression and violence flashpoints in Lagos include: Oshodi-Isolo LGA (Ajao Estate, Mafoluku, Okota, Ago Palace Way, Oke-Afa, Ejigbo areas), Amuwo-Odofin (FESTAC, Satellite town), Surulere (Aguda, Ijesha), Mushin (Jandor’s neck-of-the-woods), Apapa (Olodi Apapa, Agegunle), Alimosho (the largest and most densely populated LGA in Lagos, nay, Nigeria). This prognosis is deduced from trends, open source intelligence (OSINT) and the fact that there is a high concentration of opposition supporters, non-locals in aforesaid areas. For instance, there was election violence specifically at Ago Palace Way during the February 2019 election as suspected thugs reportedly stormed a polling unit and set ablaze no fewer than 100 ballot boxes filled with election materials. It is not unexpected that the ruling party will attempt to rein in Jandor, the PDP and the Labour party in Mushin (where the PDP gubernatorial candidate hails from), and also Alimosho, said to be the largest and most densely populated local government area in Lagos. Note that the

GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS, Nigeria, Reports, SECURITY THREATS

ELECTION SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS: HYBRID THREATS, EARLY WARNING SIGNS AND PROSPECTS OF A SEAMLESS POLITICAL TRANSITION IN NIGERIA – PART 1

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Overview Barring unforeseen circumstances, Presidential and National Assembly elections in Nigeria will hold across 109 senatorial districts and 360 federal constituencies on Saturday, February 25, 2023. Similarly, gubernatorial and State Assembly elections is slated to take place two weeks after the presidential election in 28 states and 993 state constituencies on Saturday, March 11, 2023. Three off-cycle  governorship elections for Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi states, will hold same day, Saturday, 11 November, 2023. It is interesting to note that about 48 million out of the 93.5 million eligible voters in Nigeria are youths. The implication of this is that if majority of youths exercise their franchise, they might flip the outcome of the general election. Election can be likened warfare in Nigeria and the situation is not different preparatory to the 2023 general elections. If anything, the tension, uncertainty have escalated. Synonymous with every election season in Nigeria, governance is now relegated to the back seat while ethno-religious politicking, political brinkmanship, intolerance, gaslighting, dog-whistling, disinformation seems to have taken the front seat. This election security threat assessment was carried out using publicly available information (PAI), open source intelligence (OSINT) to glean and forecast likely multidimensional or hybrid election security threats in Nigeria such as internecine conflicts, cybersecurity challenges, logistics and legal issues that could hinder the 2023 general elections. Election Security, Election War-chest And Logistics Deployment With a whopping N305 billion budgeted to conduct the 2023 general elections, it promises be the most expensive election in the annals of Nigeria. Whereas Nigeria’s amended Section 88 of the Electoral Act pegs the maximum amount to be spent by a Presidential candidate to N5bn (approximately $12m), from the current N1bn (400 per cent increase), and 1 billion Naira for gubernatorial election, a former Presidential Spokesman reckons that in reality, “No Nigerian President in the last 20 years has spent less than $100m to be President”. Given the rate of inflation and depreciation of the Naira, the war chest could have ramped up to a staggering $300m. Tells how expensive politics, prosecuting an election is in Nigeria. The forthcoming 2023 general election also promises to be a security and logistics nightmare for the electoral commission, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) who obviously have no direct control over logistics and security. For instance, barely few weeks to the general election, the Independent National Electoral Commission says the lingering petrol scarcity could hamper the movement of election materials and election personnel. Apparently, the INEC relies on private transportation and transport unions such as the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), National Association of Road Transport Owners (NARTO), Marine Workers’ Union (MWUN), to move electoral materials to the nook and cranny of the country. Similarly, the electoral Commission would rely on government security forces (GSF). The Nigerian Navy expected to help ferry election materials to riverine communities, the Nigerian Air force (NAF) will provide logistics support with its retrofitted C-130 Hercules aircraft amongst others. To this end, the INEC chairman, Mahmood Yakubu, revealed that 530,538 security agents, including policemen and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) personnel would be deployed to polling booths for the 2023 general election. Talking about logistics management, the INEC says the 2023 general elections will involve nationwide deployment of over one million personnel (including ad hoc staff), 100,000 vehicles, about 4,200 boats to be escorted by naval gunboats and massive quantities of materials to 774 LGA’s; 8,809 Electoral Wards and 176,846 polling units across the length and breadth of Nigeria. Technology will play a role in coordinating this massive logistics. In this light, he INEC says it established a ‘’Logistics Management System – Election Logistics Framework (ELF), which uses an android application and web dashboard to track election materials procurement through storage to delivery’’. Though the deployment of the Nigerian military as an election watchdog is a contentious and controversial issue, it appears the pervasive insecurity in Nigeria is an extenuating factor. As apprehension rises over the likelihood of holding elections in parts on Nigeria, the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Lucky Irabor allayed fears and assured that the elections will indeed hold as scheduled. The Defence Headquarters confirmed it would deploy substantial troops to areas ravaged by terrorists, bandits, and gunmen to ensure the safety of electorates during the polls. According to the Director, Defence Information, Major General Jimmy Akpor, “Nobody is sleeping; we’ll continue to do our utmost and scale-up our operations, intelligence and physical, kinetic and non-kinetic activities to ensure that the environment is safe for socioeconomic activities’’. To this end, there’s likely to be massive military deployment in the entire southeast, including Imo, Anambra, Benue, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto state, amongst others, before the general elections. While they are at it, the military and other security agencies must be apolitical and desist from extrajudicial killing. It is commendable that the Inspector General of Police is distributing more than 1 million copies of the 36-page Nigeria Police Force handbook – “Revised Standard Operational Guidelines/Rules for Police Officers and Other Law Enforcement Agents on Election Security Duties” ahead of the 2023 General Election. Hopefully those that would be deployed for election duties will read and assimilate the spirit and letter of the standard operating procedure which spells out “crowd control, use of force and lethal weapon, escorting and protection of election materials, general conduct, procedure of arrest, dress and accoutrement, managing political parties’ convention and rallies”, amongst others. It is a welcome development that the police hierarchy has banned the deployment of quasi security outfits established by regional or state governments such as the Southwest Security Outfit called Amotekun, Ebubeagu et al from participating in election campaigns and other electoral processes. Despite Huge Spending on Security, Insecurity Is Nigeria’s Undoing Talking about money-spinning and sapping undertakings in Nigeria, (in)security tops the list. The Nigerian government has spent more than N8 trillion on defence budgets in the last seven years while additional N722.53 billion ($1.76 billion) was borrowed from the domestic capital market. This is in

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