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COUNTER INSURGENCY

COUNTER INSURGENCY, CURATED OSINT, INTELLIGENCE, Nigeria, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

SECURITY THREATS TO THE 2023 ELECTIONS: THREAT ACTORS EVALUATION

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In two months’ time, elections are expected to be undertaken across the country; however, the implications of insecurity affecting the integrity of the polls form a fraction of the criticism of the government’s ability to provide a secure environment for the conduct of a peaceful and transparent election. Pockets of disruptive attacks by non-state actors are seen as an unavoidable occurrence given the presence of a diverse range of existing threat actors engaged in political violence across the country. Several security operations remain adequately active, having recorded feats over the past months such as the arrest or neutralization of threat actors, increased aerial interdiction, upgraded arsenals, and most importantly, vibrant intelligence-driven coordination towards arresting criminal activities across the North and South; however, despite these mentioned feats, criminality and all sorts of manifestations of insecurity continue to take a huge toll on the civilian population. One major contributing factor is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), which has resulted from illegal and porous national borders manned by a weak border security system heavily impacted by corruption and negligence. This is fueling Nigeria’s security challenges as armed groups have been able to fortify themselves thanks to easy access to illicit firearms. According to Muhammed Akinyemi’s human-angle report titled Nigeria’s Coat of Arms, “With ₦15,000 ($34), you will get a local gun. A single barrel long-range [can be bought] for ₦25,000 ($57).” The proliferation of illicit weapons encourages acts of terror, gradually pushing the population into despondency, and also likely to encourage apathy, the political issues associated with this is looked into in Yusuf Gupa’s Dynamics Of The 2023 Elections. This article looks to discuss some of these security threat actors, their evolution, their strengths, and their impact on the elections in 2023.  Bandits Ragtag bandit groups, which are decentralized, unidentified armed groups generally operating in areas where states have shown an inability to exercise their authority in Nigeria’s northwest and northcentral regions, have contributed considerably to a surge in security threats associated with bandit terror campaigns such as violent assaults on commuters and villages, murder, kidnappings, and skirmishes with security services, the latter of which has triggered heavy kinetic offensives by the military.  For 11 years, banditry has persisted, with civilians bearing the brunt of crimes that have resulted in high fatalities, displacement, and severe economic shocks. The reign of bandits has evolved over time to encompass parallel administrations, in which they manage towns under their control, encouraging tax collection, forced marriages, and combatant recruiting. Bandits’ threat has been sustained during the pre-election season, primarily comprised of kidnapping and small-weapons attacks against political chieftains and election officials, with no clear motive to support or oppose the elections. A typical example of these attacks include; Kaduna Kajuru LGA – Around 1 April 2022, a Kaduna militia abducted seven persons related to the PDP chairman in Kajuru LGA. One abductee was released earlier on health grounds, one was killed after the ransom demands were not met. Chikun LGA – On 22 September 2022, a Kaduna militia attacked some chieftains of the APC, wounded three people, killed two, and abducted others at Tashar Icce near Kujama (Chikun, Kaduna). The victims were coming back from a political meeting in Kujama. Kagarko LGA: On April 25, 2022, a Kaduna militia killed an APC ward chairman and several others when they attacked several communities in Kagarko LGA (Kaduna). Scores of residents were abducted, others were seriously wounded, and some cows and household animals were seized. Kajuru LGA—  Around April 2022 (as reported), members of a Kaduna militia killed one of the seven abductees related to the PDP chairman of Kajuru LGA over the non-payment of ransom. Katsina  Katsina LGA – On 3 September 2022, policemen clashed with a Katsina militia who abducted three people in the Katsina metropolis (Katsina, Katsina). One of the abductees was the candidate for the Kankia zone state house of assembly from the PDP, his wife, and the registrar of Isa Kaita college of education. Niger Mariga LGA – On 25 May 2022, members of a Niger communal militia killed four PDP delegates between Mariga and Tegina (Mariga, Niger) while they were on their way home from Minna. The vehicle the victims were travelling in was shot at by the assailants. Zamfara  Anka LGA – On April 1, 2022, members of a Zamfara militia abducted an unspecified number of commuters, including two APC members, on the Anka-Zuru federal highway in Dajin Daki Takwas, Anka LGA (Zamfara). Nasiru Yari (APC), who was one of the abductees, was released. Bukkuyum LGA – On 29 June 2022, Zamfara militiamen abducted an unspecified number of persons from Gadar Zaima, coded to Bukuyum (Bukkuyum, Zamfara) on the village market day. The abductees include the village head, a political secretary of a political party from Kyaram. Tsafe LGA – On 6 June 2022, Zamfara militiamen abducted a former permanent commissioner of the Zamfara Independent Electoral commission alongside his younger brother at Gidan-Giye, near Tsafe town (Zamfara). The abductees were trying to fix their car which developed a fault. Zurmi LGA – On 28 October 2022, a Zamfara militia led by Gwaska Dankarami simultaneously invaded two residences and abducted two persons in Dauran Birnin Tsaba (Zurmi, Zamfara). The abductees were a district head and an APC chieftain, the militia leader called the abductee’s relative to confirm the abduction which he claimed was a reprisal for the seizure of his motorcycles by security operatives. The majority of the group’s activity has been propelled by various ineffective initiatives in dealing with the situation, which evolved from genuine anti-marginalization agitation to pure terrorism and criminality. The porous environment, on the other hand, over time allowed for the massive proliferation of SALW, which fell into the hands of these groups ushering acts of terror and, in fact, drawing the interest of several other actors, including organized armed groups such as Lakurawa [an armed militia group from Mali] in Sokoto State, armed religious sects such as Dar-Salam scattered in Nassawara, Niger, and

COUNTER INSURGENCY, CURATED OSINT, Nigeria, PRESS RELEASE, SECURITY THREATS

COMMENTARY: ZAMFARA STATE GOVERNMENT RULING ON GUNS

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A BBC TALKING POINT INTERVIEW FEATURING TANWA ASHIRU, CEO BULWARK INTELLIGENCE. Zamfara State government recently announced that its citizens could obtain guns to protect themselves from the incessant attacks against armed bandits. The announcement stated: “The government has directed the state commissioner of police to issue gun licenses to those who quality and are wishing to obtain such guns to defend themselves. The government is ready to facilitate people, especially our farmers to secure basic weapons for defending themselves”. It is important to get one thing clear. The current system is not working. When communities get attacked, law enforcement personnel are hardly around to defend the citizens from these attackers. So, approving civilian use of arms will at least give the citizens a fighting chance of survival. The recent ruling of the Zamfara state government to approve civilian use of guns for their personal protection is a clear indictment on the inability of the Nigerian government security forces to effectively protect its citizens from armed attacks. The consequences of granting citizens access to weapons are two pronged: On one hand, the citizens might do a great job of eliminating these armed attackers and pushing them out of their communities. On the other hand, it might backfire, as the armed attackers who have access to funding derived from kidnap for ransom proceeds, could invest in heavier weapons and fighters and intensify their attacks. That means conflict and fatalities in these regions could significantly increase. – We have been seeing an increasing level of violence and kidnappings across Nigeria – what role are guns playing in this? All security challenges across Nigeria today involve the use of arms. Everything ranging from the insurgency in North east Nigeria, kidnapping and armed banditry in northwest, the unknown gunmen attacks in the southeast, involve the use of guns. A 2017 report on small arms and light weapons revealed that there were approximately 6.1 million small arms in the hands of civilian non-state actors, while 586,000 which is approximately 9.5% are in the hands of law enforcement or state actors. Some illicit arms are produced by local arms manufacturers who typically operate from makeshift factories, without legal permits or proper government oversight. While other illicit arms are smuggled illegally through Nigeria’s poorly secured borders. A recent report indicated that illicit arms in southern Nigeria come predominantly from Eastern European and Asian sources, while in northern Nigeria, illicit arms originate from Libya and are trafficked into the country through the Nigerien border. – Is citizen taking up arms an effective way of control the violence?  More arms is never a long term viable solution. One thing the government has not properly considered is what happens to the weapons after relative peace has been restored. How would the state government intend to ensure their citizens do not use the weapons to perpetrate crime as socio-economic conditions increase poverty and pressure on the people. The state government did note that it will issue the gun ownership approval license only to those who qualify, however, it was not clear on the qualification criteria. A lot of attacks and reprisal attacks persist because of the country’s poor judicial system More effort needs to be put into non-kinetic and non-violent efforts such as strengthening the justice system, encouraging community dialogue and enhancing conflict resolution structures.

COUNTER INSURGENCY, CURATED OSINT, Nigeria, Reports, TERRORISM

ABUJA-KADUNA TRAIN ATTACK AND MATTERS ARISING

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The Insecurity bedevilling North-West Nigeria reached a tumultuous turn on March 28th when bandits in collaboration with a suspected Boko Haram splinter cell; Ansaru in collaboration e Abuja-Kaduna Train. The train had above 500 passengers on board and the attack led to the kidnap of hundreds and the killing of at least 8. This attack was not isolated, the railway itself had been attacked previously in October last year when a portion of the rail track was destroyed with explosives and the Kaduna International Airport just weeks ago. This recent attack was a repetition in a series to destroy public infrastructure and brutalize citizens. It behoves questions as to why the popular saying “Once bitten twice shy” is lost on those saddled with the responsibility of protecting life and property. A repeat of this attack was imminent, yet no systems, processes and structures were put in place to thwart it. The recent attack raises a lot of questions as regards coordination in government, appropriate security measures, surveillance, and the failure of authorities to act on intelligence and work in consonance. It reflects a troubling breakdown of internal security and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Shockingly, the brazen nature of the bandit’s attack which is essentially a challenge to our sovereignty as a nation has not adequately infuriated the Federal and State Governments to do something drastic and long-lasting against them. The style and nature of the attack reveal that it was a well-planned attack aimed at the maximum achievement of their aim. The bandits utilized an Improvised explosive device (IED) to immobilise the train before indiscriminately shooting at the passengers. These sinister and brazen attacks against commuters and public infrastructure are one too many and must be forestalled at this juncture. The Abuja-Kaduna highway has been an avowed kidnapping hotspot for the better part of 7 years, Federal Government has been unable to put in place stringent security measures to effectively police and secure that road. This condition made the railway a preferable alternative for travellers. An alternative that well is now clearly unsafe. It is more than embarrassing that Kaduna state which is Nigeria’s centre for military education and security planning due to its numerous elite military establishment and security institutions such as the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Industries Corporation (DICON), Nigerian Army School of Artillery in Kachia, Nigerian Navy School of Armament Technology, State Security Service Training Academy, Police College, the Nigerian College of Aviation Technology (NCAT), Nigerian Navy School of Armament Technology and many other military formations is unsafe to access by road, air or train. Against the backdrop of this terrible attack, the million-dollar question is how does one travel in and out of Kaduna safely. Nigeria’s Armed Forces have been carrying out clearance operations and airstrikes to clear bandits out of their camps hidden in forests across several states in the northwest. But the violence has continued. Stemming this tide would take not just the military but other concerned agencies to diligently perform their responsibilities and task. It became public knowledge through a Daily Trust report after the attack that the Kaduna State Government through its Ministry for Internal Security twice wrote a letter to the National Railway Corporation advising for the 6 pm service of the train station to be stopped but the corporation did not heed. This indicates clear negligence on the path of the railway corporation. Individuals have never been held accountable for such ineffective discharge of their responsibilities and perhaps there’s a correlation between that and sloppy conduct/negligence. This costly negligence should not go unpunished so government agencies understand consequences exist for sloppy conduct. The vulnerability of the train was exacerbated by a lack of commitment and proactiveness. In reacting to the incident the Minister for Transport, Hon. Rotimi Ameachi said “We knew what the problems will be. We know we needed to have digital security equipment on the corridors. We applied for it. Let me just stop here so I don’t hurt so many people. But I heard the president has given a directive that the procurement must be completed immediately. “If we had those equipment on the tracks, you will see the entire track. And we warned that lives would be lost. Now, lives were lost. Eight persons dead and 25 persons in the hospital. We don’t know how many people have been kidnapped. And the cost of those equipment is just N3bn. The cost of what we have lost is more than N3bn. We have lost track. We have lost locomotives and coaches. We have lost human beings. And the equipment is just N3bn. To fix the damages will cost more than N3bn. To imagine that we just said give us the approval and not even the money. At the time we asked for it, when you come with sincerity to government and people are stopping you, it is annoying.” “When you come with sincerity to Government and your colleagues and people are stopping you, it is annoying”. His comment is indicative of a lack of urgency and harmony in dealing with important issues at the apex level of government. A pertinent issue like security equipment for train coaches deserved speedy treatment and not the dillydallying that caused a lack of surveillance. A seeming lack of a standard operational response or arrangement is evident. It is inconceivable that despite prior attacks the authorities lacked a standard response to repel this attack nearby and swiftly. The previous security arrangement of two policemen per coach was ineffective for a security threat that comprises tens of bandits on motorbikes each armed with an AK-47 assault rifle. There is an urgent need to devise a security strategy that adequately protects passengers and public infrastructure. This security strategy would involve all security and intelligence agencies living up to their responsibilities and being proactive. Account from survivors of the train attack says that the terrorists arrived in a convoy of motorbikes. An interface or established channel of communication between locals within these

BORDER SECURITY, COUNTER INSURGENCY, CURATED OSINT, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

THE UPSURGE OF BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR NORTH REGION OF CAMEROON

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Since 2014 the Nigerian based terrorist group Boko Haram has been carrying out assassinations and large-scale acts of violence in Cameroon, and for years now, the Republic of Cameroon has been living in a continuous sequence of armed attacks attributed to the insurgent group. These continuous attacks have resulted in tension in the Far North region of the country as they are usually indiscriminate, targeting both civilians and GSF. However, GSF posts and camps are generally the main targets. The insurgence of the incursions in the region could be attributed to the fact that the region shares a border with Nigeria which has been immensely troubled by Boko Haram activities, coupled with the fact that they have gone through leadership crisis and are currently seeking to expand their territory from Northern Nigeria to neighbouring countries including Cameroon. The Islamist armed group Boko Haram has stepped up attacks on civilians and security forces in towns and villages in the Far North region of Cameroon since December 2020. During the months of December 2021 and January 2022, a total of twenty-three (23) fatalities, and thirteen (13) casualties have been recorded during Boko Haram attacks, which include security officials. Intel further suggests that six individuals have also been abducted during this period.  The focal points of these terrorist attacks are the Mayo-Sava department and the Mayo-Tsanaga department in the Far North region, precisely in Mora, Masla, Kolofata, Kouape, Koza, Hitere, and Moudoukoua. The formation of self-defense groups (vigilante), to combat these attacks, has encouraged violence and arbitrated community conflicts. Significant communal conflicts have been noted in the Logone-et-Chari department, in the Far North region which has led to the displacement of thirty individuals. In 2015, the African Union established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to respond to Boko Haram attacks across the Lake Chad basin. The current anglophone crisis has played a major role in easing the activities of Boko Haram militiamen, as the army is also confronting separatist insurgency in the country’s Anglophone regions and the threat of cross-border raids by rebels in the neighboring Central African Republic, therefore, leaving the Far North region void.  The rate of these attacks has become a significant cause for worry in the Far North region. Following the previous trend, the operational environment and the population remain at the mercy of attacks as violent Islamist and inter-communal attacks are likely to persist. Therefore, it is essential for Cameroon and the multinational force to improve on the number of counter-terrorism activities carried out in the Far North region.

COUNTER INSURGENCY, GLOBAL SECURITY, HEALTH SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS

COVID-19 in Nigeria: Strategic Response Review by Mr Adesina Tiamiyu

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I have been worried about the rising case of infection among Nigerians daily and it becomes worrisome that what we thought was a foreign infection has now taken a seat in our country.The Government has done its best to prevent the spread, provide medical care and support for patients. Following on that was the lockdown of Lagos, Ogun and FCT and provision of supports to the vulnerable in our society which is good.The Private sectors have also come to support and we should all commend government as well as all those who support it for doing wonderfully well. However, despite all these, we have been having a steady climb in the rate of infection as community infection has set in coupled with the breakdown of law and other in some areas including the breaking of the lockdown rules. It is because of these that I write to advise the Government to look into the following areas to improve the situation at hand. Nigeria has about 17% of Africa’s population, meaning that about 1.7 million Nigerians are likely to be infected. This is alarming and a concerted effort is needed to defeat this pandemic. Yes government has locked down the country for about four months now but lockdown without testing is a waste. Government need to be aggressive with its testing capacities because the truth is that, the more we test the more we have more cases. Our cases are few today because our tests are few. Let us bring test centers into many communities and equip it to promptly do test rather than asking people to wait until they see symptoms. This will mean some people will be close to dying before they are detected. This must be of high priority. Following on this is the creation of isolation centre to cope with the number of cases that will arise from more testing. Wealthy Nigerians should emulate GTB and other private sector donor.  For instance major event centers can make available their facility to save funds that would have been used to build new ones.Government can then commission Foam manufacturing industries as well as textile companies to come in and provide bed and beddings that will make an isolation or even treatment centers spring up fast. Rather than the 08000CORONA that is confusing even to the literate, what is stopping Lagos state government from using the popular emergency toll free numbers 112/767 which Lagosians are already familiar with? Our cases are few today because our tests are few. All it needs to do is to first put the system in the Call Center in good condition, get medical support staff trained in handling calls dedicated to Covid 19 from where care in form of calming callers down and letting them know help will come.They should also take their details and pass on to field operatives that will immediately swing into action and get to the person. Such field operatives should immediately call the caller back to inform them that they are coming and take further information on the go. This will work better than this new style where existing infrastructure is neglected whereas these are part of the reasons the call centre was set up. Stigmatization is also a very worrying part of the challenge. Mrs. Dafinone is courageous and that won the battle for her. The woman and some other survivors should be used as the face of the next phase of the campaigns and not any other persons who cannot explain the situation. We should know that Covid 19 is not a sexually transmitted disease and anybody can be infected even right in your home if you’re careless. Our people should not stigmatize those infected. They need our love, support and prayers to go through it and win.It is good that government has embarked on various palliative measures to alleviate the sufferings of the less privileged among us and the old and vulnerable. At such sharing centers, what we have are a crowd of unruly people, consisting of mainly young able bodied Nigerians majority of who are not envisaged in this arrangement. No respect for social distancing.Rather than share rice, the food court initiatives will work better but not the way it is being done now where badly prepared and inadequate ration are being served to people like beggars. No respect for social distancing. Rather than share rice, the food court initiatives will work better but not the way it is being done now where badly prepared and inadequate ration are being served to people like beggars. Government should not make emergency millionaires of some people but rather engage reputable and well know eateries with capacities to produce in large numbers, cooked food all over Lagos and therefore get vehicles to take them into centers that should be provided in wards, churches and mosques where those the food are meant for are registered and everybody knows his own centre and the number. If you are not registered in a place, you don’t have any business going there. Daily rations of those who have been registered are taken there daily and any unknown face that shows up is easily identified and taken away. Let us respect the dignity of our people even in this period of national crisis. I also remember that the effect of these lockdown especially on the jobless youths has brought the crime rate to an all time high. Rather than engage these boys in terror for terror as we witness these days when street boys arm themselves in wait for the so called 1 million boys, government can reach them through the Nigeria police and engage them as fumigators, cleaners and gardeners at isolation centers or to follow trucks from the food courts to help share as well as using them to gather intelligence on crime. Those to be used must be quickly trained, well kitted for their assignment, provide them food as well as pay for their services. Some of them will sure get involved and whoever decide

BORDER SECURITY, COUNTER INSURGENCY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS

UNDERSTANDING THE ZAMFARA SECURITY THREAT

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SUMMARY Zamfara state is located in the North West region of Nigeria. It has 14 Local Government Areas and a population of approximately 3.8 million people. Zamfara is bordered to the north by Niger Republic, to the south by Kaduna state, to the east by Katsina and to the west by Sokoto and Niger states. Zamfara state’s ethnic majority are Hausas and Herders, while minority ethnic groups include Gwari, Kamuku, Kambari, Dukawa, Busawa and Zabarma. Other ethnic groups found within the state are Igbo, Yoruba, Kanuri, Nupe and Tiv. The main languages spoken in Zamfara state are Hausa, Fulfulde and Arabic. The predominant occupation of the people is Agriculture with 80% of the population engaged in agricultural activities. Zamfara has a high level of poverty with over 70.8% poverty rating. Zamfara has been plagued with security challenges which has grown incessantly worse over time. Hoodlum attacks, banditry and cattle rustling are major challenges they deal with. The porous border with Niger Republic has exposed Zamfara state to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. High levels of unemployment and uneducated youth with nothing to do, has encouraged the formation of criminal gangs with easy access to arms. While the vast land expanse and deep forests have provided safe havens for criminal gangs who raid villages, kill citizens, rustle cattle, kidnap for ransom and attack travelers on the highway. Much of the insecurity has been tackled by vigilante groups and hunters. Policemen and soldiers are often attacked and killed. The local law enforcement frequently report arrests of criminals, but not much is known about what happens there after. DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES In February 2018, the Zamfara state governor stated that with a population of over 4 million, the were only 2,000 policemen, 315 soldiers, 400 mobile policemen and less than 100 air force personnel. Although, these numbers are likely to have increased in recent times. As at 1 April 2019, the Nigerian Army launched ‘Exercise Harbin Kunama IV’ focused on tackling the armed bandits and insurgent groups from identified forest areas and strongholds in Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara States. Heretofore, much of the defense related activities reported were Nigerian Airforce deploying air assets to launch airstrike on suspected bandit hideouts in the forests. The vastly ungoverned spaces and the forests provide major cover and protection for criminals in the state. While these may have been tactically successful, they have not been strategically successful in stemming the menace. Troops deployed to Zamfara experience direct small arms fire from the criminal groups. The criminal groups frequently patrol the communities and ask the locals questions about the capabilities, strength size, leadership and TTPs of the troops assigned to the area. The police in the area have been known to flee either at the onset or during intense attacks. One key complaint given by troops operating in the area, is the mode of transportation used by the bandits. The bandits utilize fast motorcycles which allow for easy maneuver evasion and escape, whereas, the troops have to utilize pick-up trucks and MRAPs which are comparatively inflexible. Another issue has to do with the delays and push backs they receive when requesting airstrikes on known enemy location. Those requests are often met with bureaucratic paperwork processes detrimental to successfully tactical operations. In the case of close air support, the response often comes too late (up to 1.5hrs after initial request in some cases). BANDITRY AND KIDNAPPING THREAT Banditry and kidnapping are the two main security threats and concern in Zamfara today. Farming and herding communities in Zamfara and the wider region have long been terrorised by gangs who raid villages, stealing cattle and kidnapping residents for ransom. Zamfara is largely an ungoverned space and in response to the incessant insecurity, residents began forming and hiring local vigilante groups to confront the armed criminal groups. This development has given rise to the recent increase in violent incidents, as accusations of extrajudicial killings of suspected bandits have arisen. In addition, the criminal groups have begun conducting reprisal attacks against the vigilante groups to avenge the death of their members. According to reports[1], villagers would rather vigilante groups are disbanded because the communities with them are usually on the receiving end of vicious reprisal attacks by the bandits. The poor governance in the state has exacerbated illegal gold mining in which many of the criminal gangs operating in the region have links to. However, gold mining communities are also frequently targeted. In a reported incident approx. 50 bandits cordoned off the area, robbed the mines, demanding for gold and other precious stones from the miners. Figure 2 Zamfara illegal gold mining operations are large scale with some reports indicating that security personnel have on occasion been found providing static security for the mines. A recent report from Ahmad Salkida which reviewed information gathered from interviews with community members in Zamfara state paints a picture of a state that is being run by organized criminal syndicates: You will see them (the armed bandits) in broad daylight brandishing their AK 47 rifles. In some communities, they move freely, demanding of the villagers to mind their business, while they (bandits) mind theirs. Some members of the community even approach the bandits to settle their disputes. The bandits lord it over these territories with 100% control. The only difference between them and Boko Haram is that they do not govern or administer Sharia. Some of these communities are mostly in Zamfara north. In Birnin Magaji, there is a village like Gidan Kasso and Dumburu, close to Niger Republic that are completely subject to the bandits. But as at today, there is no part of Zamfara state that is not affected by either armed banditry or kidnap for ransom”[1] Many believe the attackers are Fulanis from both Niger Republic as well as Nigeria. Interestingly, their targets are also local Fulani cattle-rearers who have no means of protecting themselves. The motivation for these Zamfara attacks is primarily pecuniary. Attacks initially focused on stealing cattle

COUNTER INSURGENCY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY THREATS, TERRORISM

Boko Haram: The Letter That Isolated Shekau, Created ISWAP and Killed Its Author Mamman Nur.

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Boko Haram Abubakar Shekau (JAS) and Abu Musab Albarnawi (ISWAP) factions are locally and regionally established with a unique mastery of the local people, culture and terrain. Backed by experienced returning foreign fighters from the left over ruins of Raqqa and Mosul. The current leadership and top commanders are ideologically driven, globally affiliated and supported by ISIS and Al-Qaeda core in North Africa and the Middle East. In remote Local government areas in some parts of North East Nigeria, Northern Cameroon and the Lake Chad basin, Boko Haram factions have for the past decade, deployed a consistent terror pattern against soft civilian and hard military targets indicating that these jihadist wield deep local support, made easier by the inability of national and regional security forces to guarantee day to day governance and security to ordinary civilians. Local residents caught in remote villages with no where else to go are forced to trust Boko Haram factions to survive. In most cases, they are obliged to provide them with regular intelligence as the only option to stay alive and out of real fear – but squarely at the detriment of government and security forces in the region. Defeating such a fearless and suicidal jihadist organisation that has captured the hearts and minds of the local population requires measures that go far beyond big bombs and big guns. Luck and group self destruction actions can play a huge role to enhance and make effective other counter strategies. Nothing good can come of Boko Haram internal splits and self destruct scenarios if security stakeholders lack the ability and willingness to take full advantage of an enemy’s daytime blunder. Boko Haram then second in Command – Mamman Nur along with 10 key commanders including Abu Musab Albarnawi (Habeeb), one of the surviving sons of Boko Haram’s Founding father Mohammed Yusuf, decided it was the perfect time to part ways with his former Boss – Abubakar Shekau – and create a separate faction. Mamman Nur justified his action through a letter to the Islamic State copied to Abubakar Shekau. The letter titled ‘Exposed’- mentioned in the letter isolated Shekau from Isis, led to the appointment of Muhammed Yusuf’s son as the leader of the Islamic State of West Africa province and the eventual assassination of the author – Mamman Nur by commanders loyal to Abu Musab Albarnawi but not fully detached from the Abubakar Shekau faction.  This letter provided and continues to provide enough intelligence on the modus operandi of Boko Haram factions and why the ISWAP faction is taking the current shape.  Days after ISIL names Abu Musab Habeeb Muhammed Al Barnawi as new Ameer of Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) to replace Abubakar Shekau, things began to hit the fan within Boko Haram splinter factions. The leadership of both factions accused the other of misinterpreting the Quran and Hadith to suit their personal power interest. This revelation, if property utilized, could potentially be the greatest insight into the true leadership, operational strategy, ideology, external links of Boko Haram since Abubakar Shekau took over from late Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Other strategic revelations followed including the reaction of Shekau via audio and video. The master minder of the ISWAP splinter group – Mamman Nur accused Abubakar Shekau of making himself ruthless dictator who did not consult his Shura council members before taking key decision including planning attacks; Shekau  slaughtered his top commanders without good reason ; They revealed to ISIS core that Shekau did not pledge allegiance willingly, he was forced to pledge allegiance to ISIL in March 2015 based on a threat by top commanders to abandon him; His internal security was revealed – Abubakar Shekau was guarded by a group of 10 specially selected fighters whose loyalty was to him and not the group; The coordinated Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) had inflicted massive casualty on Boko Haram cells; Boko Haram captives and fighters were seriously shut of vital weapons and food; Boko Haram children, women and militants were left to starve to death in favour of selected fighters ; Boko Haram had established network beyond Nigeria and the region and this was a potential source of support and information sharing beyond imagination. The letter revealed very strategic information, detailing the leadership of Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau and by extension the ideological and operational modus operandi of the ISWAP Abu Musab Albarnawi Faction within the region. MAMMAN NUR:  Mamman Nur is dead. Some local sources claim he was killed by his own much younger and enthusiastic ISWAP commanders after he was accused of deviating from ISWAP policies in the Daptchi release and a botched Leah Sharibu leaked deal. Other sources say his death was on secret orders of Shekau by his own close commanders who had retained some connections with their former Emir Abubakar Shekau after the bitter split and the revelation Nur made in the ‘Exposed’ letter which convinced ISIS core to replace and abandon him in favour of young Abu Musab Albarnawi. It is difficult to verify the authenticity of any of the above versions at the time of writing but the truest version is that Mamman Nur – long time Boko Haram second in Command, founder of Ansaru and author of ISWAP is no longer breathing. Nur and Khalid Al-Barnawi (Now in police custody – snatched by DSS forces in Kogi) formed Ansaru after the first split from Boko Haram in 2012. This first ever split was equally based on Shekau’s tight leadership and power control, how he personally interpreted his actions without ideological backings and his ruthless tactic of killing anyone Muslim or non-Muslim without proof of their guilt. Both groups reunited sometime in 2015 for a common purpose against the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – a reunion said to have been made possible by the intervention of Khalid Al – Barnawi who retained close links to both Shekau and Nur: Mamman Nur did not have the Book Haram Kanuri -origin. He was Shuwa –

COUNTER INSURGENCY

The Evolving Threat Of Knife Attacks – A Peril On Our Streets!!

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Introduction Citizens must learn that responding to the dangers of a knife attack begins long before they are staring into the cold, lifeless eyes of a knife or machete-wielding attacker. They must accept that the world is a dangerous place and adopt the survival mindset. One in which they recognise that they are ultimately responsible for their own safety. The constant knife, swords and machete attacks in the United Kingdom that have left many dead and others critically injured — adds great credence to the fact that we are facing an ever-escalating threat that challenges both law enforcement and private citizens around the globe.   The fact is that lone wolves and small cells require far less planning, are more difficult to detect and can execute these types of attacks with little skill or training. Traditional knives, swords, machetes, ice picks and other edged and pointed weapons have historically been overlooked as a potential threat to public safety because they are so common in our daily lives. We use them every day in the kitchen and for a variety of tasks around the house and at work. We see many people carrying pocket knives for a variety of purposes, which desensitizes society to the risks they pose. As if criminal acts with knives or the numerous random knife attacks and mass stabbings we have seen in the last several years aren’t enough, the emerging threats of knife attacks as the basic weapon of choice by a terrorist is a real paradigm shift that should scare you into preparation! Let’s take a quick look at a few of the knife-related attacks in the last several years (and a good deal of this does not include street crimes) around the globe: Mass knife attack Franklin Regional High School Murrysville, Pennsylvania, 21 students wounded – 2014. Kunming Railway Station attack in China – March 2014. University of Calgary 5 killed in knife attack – April 2014 The wave of terror known as the “knife Intifada” in Israel starting in early September 2015 with 217 Israeli casualties. University of California, Merced stabbing spree – Nov 2015 Chicago mass stabbing leaves 6 dead – Feb 2016 New York City (NYPD ) 900 slashings, stabbings last year alone! April 2016 Mass stabbing in Anaheim, California – June 2016 19 people killed and 26 injured in a stabbing spree near Tokyo – July 2016 Swiss train attack in August 2016. Russell Square knife attacker in Central London August 2016. Nine injured in terror-related knife attack in Minnesota mall – Sept 2016 Mass knife attack at a Texas college – May 2017 Egypt attack at a hotel – July 2017. NYC subway knife attacks – Sept 2017 40,000 offences involving a knife or sharp instrument in England and Wales 2017 and 1,296 stabbings in London unto April 2018 according to Met reports (massive surge!) London Harrow, Northolt, and Brixton, 3 stabbings in separate incidents. June 2018  Sounds Like Open Season On Private Citizens Around The Globe? The current threat level indicates the existing trend is going to get much worse. One of the challenges faced as experts in Anti-Knife Terrorism and Crime is getting people to understand the pure dangers of a knife. If you think knife attacks look like those typically seen in a martial arts class, you are unaware and unprepared! Real knife attacks involve an element of surprise, distraction and a blur of a quick series of stabs and slashes that are going to overwhelm your senses and your ability to respond. Even in untrained hands, an attacker’s movements will paralyze your rational thought and make it practically impossible for you to defend yourself. And an experienced attacker will move very quickly with a flurry of slashes and stabs to your limbs so you have no chance of stopping them from targeting your vitals such as your heart, throat, neck, eyes, head and other major organs such as your liver and kidneys. You may have some level of training in which you were taught to “ax” block the knife or grab the hand holding the knife. But these tactics will do nothing more than make you vulnerable and expose more targets for the attacker to strike. Criminals Often Use Tactics To Appear Non-Threatening And what about those who live in countries where they are legally allowed to carry a concealed firearm? This inevitably comes up at every workshop we have ever done, whether it is to law enforcement, military or concerned citizens. They say, “Jeff, David, I carry concealed and know how to press the trigger. I’m not worried because I will not hesitate to shoot them.” That may sound good in theory, but there are a number of issues surrounding the employment of a firearm in dealing with an edged-weapon attack, and that does not even include considerations should you manage to deploy the weapon and incapacitate the attacker. Always integrate instinct and decision making to seize or create opportunities to defend efficiently and intelligently Remember, a knife is a point-of-contact weapon. So, an attacker will need to close the gap between the two of you in such a way that you will be unaware of the vicious plan. An attacker typically does this in a manner that will seem unobtrusive and innocuous. They know they have to appear non-threatening so you won’t run or call for help or have a chance to draw a weapon. A common tactic used by perpetrators is the pretence of asking questions. This normally works, and always rarely seem to set off any alarm bells because most people are kind and want to help others. Some questions typically asked to get in close proximity are: “Do you have the time?” “I seem to be lost. Can you give me directions?” “My car broke down. Can I borrow your cell phone to make a call to my family?” “Do you have a cigarette/or a lighter?” “Excuse me, ma’am/sir, I think you dropped this.” … an obvious distraction that catches

COUNTER INSURGENCY

The Russian ‘Novichok’ Attack – Africa Should Watch Out For The Newcomer

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Introduction In a globalized world threatened by growing interconnected Jihadist movements and rogue states, events in one part of the globe has the potential to spill-over to the rest of the world. So when next you notice your neighbour’s beard is on fire, first sprinkle water on yours, and help your neighbour put the fire out because if left to spread, your beards too will soon be engulfed in flames . When Detective Sergeant Bailey rushed to the scene in Salisbury with the intention to rescue the Skripal’s who were unconscious and slumped on a bench in the city centre, neither Sergeant Bailey nor anyone close to the scene had an idea that they too could be exposed to a secondary ‘Newcomer’ nerve agent more deadly than sarin and VX. The UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down concluded that the Chemical agent used for the attempted murder of double spy agent Sergie Skripal, his daughter Yulia and the first responder Detective Sergeant Bailey who suffered a secondary contamination- was indeed a Russian made Novichok agent.  These advanced and extremely difficult to detect nerve agents were developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s under operation Foliant but the collapse of the Soviet Union means these deadly nerve agents could have ended up anywhere friend or foe.   Even before concluding formal investigations, the UK and its US , France , Germany , NATO and EU allies have reached a unanimous and what seems to be an irreversible verdict that Kremlin is behind the attempted murder. In defence, Kremlin power house has denied that it had any direct or indirect involvement with the Salisbury incident and that it is willing to corporate with the UK and other international organisations in their investigation to determine who was behind the ‘Newcomer’ attack of March 4 2018. The UK has already applied ‘robust’ sanctions against Russia and Kremlin has retaliated in the same spirit. The ‘Newcomer’ is described as more deadly than the VX agent used to kill the half brother (Kim Jong-Nam) of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un at the Kuala Lumpur international airport in February 2017. Miraculously, the Skripal’s are still in critical condition (at the time of writing) and first responder Detective Sergeant Bailey has recovered from the secondary exposure. Full credits for the recovery of Sergeant Bailey and the survival of the Skripal’s goes to the established structure of the UK Chemical,Biological,Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE ) unit and for their Preparedness, Rapid Identification , Intervention, Medical Response, and coordinated nationwide Investigation Capabilities. As more states develop CBRNE weapons capability behind closed doors as a pretext of self defence, the chances of some of these nerve agents falling into the hands of rogue regimes and non-state groups willing to use or sell these weapons to achieve a perceived terror goal has increased and remains a viable global threat.   The increase in Home Grown Terrorist and thousands of desperate African Foreign Fighter Returnees limping back to the fragile North Africa, East Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad region to rejoin the likes of Al-AlQaeda in Libya;The Islamic State – Sinai Province; Jama’a Nusratul-Islam wa al-Muslim (JNIM); Boko Haram and Alshabaab is an Indication that Africa must brace itself against the inevitable deployment of conventional and non-conventional weapons. African nations remain structurally unprepared against the possibility of a nerve agent attack either from a reckless state or non-state actor linked to ISIL and AL Qaeda core vying for a safe haven in the fragile continent.  Recommendations: Consultancy and Training for strategic, tactical and operational first responders should be a priority. A good CBRNE plan should focus on assessing local to national structural needs; training on Incident Scene Assessment Teams; Enhancing Medical crisis Management; promote CBRNE public education and Awareness programmes; Increase CBRNE early warning and Reporting mechanism; Allocate Effective Detection technologies, Sampling and Identification; Train First responders against Recognition and Contamination control; and continuously exercise Decontamination and Extraction of casualties from threat zones. African states need to be more proactive and develop or enhance a well coordinated national CBRNE capacity to protect first responders and the general public from contamination effects. Unfortunately, CBRNE attacks will increase in the current global volatile environment and African states remain highly vulnerable to any nerve agent attack. Structures for CBRNE units and training for operators and first responders must be prioritised for detection, response and damage limitation. Rogue regimes and non state actors will stop at nothing to attack soft and hard targets with whatever deadly weapon they can lay their hands on, including highly poisonous nerve agents like Novichok, especially as such attacks carry the weight of international media attention necessary for global Jihadist propaganda. Global Risk International in Partnership with SECINDEF delivers CBRNE consultancy and training at the highest level. Our International experts make use of local dynamics , threats and resources to design a bespoke package to deal with existing and predictive CBRNE threats. For more information on developing in country CBRNE capabilities please contact any of our experts.

COUNTER INSURGENCY

Adverse climate change pattern will lead to more ‘weather wars’ Counter Terrorism expert warns.

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Introduction The collapse of the ecology due to over grazing, deforestation, unrestricted and uncontrolled farming has resulted to an increase in local conflicts, primarily for access over rare grazing fields, food stuff, scarce water supply, cattle rustling and at worse, ‘rural intifada’ of farmers, fishermen and nomadic pastoralists searching for greener pastures in ‘another man’s land’. Dramatic changes in weather patterns is fast becoming a precondition and trigger for many civil wars but also an enabling factor for sustaining an ISIL – Boko Haram jihadist style terrorism in the Sahel and the Middle East. However, the transformation pattern of these ‘weather wars’ and their severity depends hugely on local state, private and community proactive preventative and response mechanism. What We Are Not Saying This climate change conflict relationship analysis acknowledges the key role of other religious, political and economic major push and pull factors not linked to the impact of climate change patterns on local or international conflicts. In Doubt Fight or Flight, A Natural Human Reaction A natural human instinct is for people to flee their habitats in order to survive situations of flood, droughts, livelihood and starvation. Faced with such predicaments, humans will do whatever it takes to migrate and save themselves even if it comes to fighting and dying for survival in an alternative safe space belonging to a hostile or friendly neighbour. Not even threats of death, high wall fences, borders and oceans act as migration and settlement deterrent when such a disaster strikes. To many, the choice is simple, fight or flight, stay and die. In choosing the choice of migration the survival risk is 50/50 depending on your destination and your traveling behaviour. The ‘weather War’ in Nigeria and CAR The nomadic Fulani pastoralist in the middle belt region of Nigeria (an extension from Central Africa Republic CAR) and the local farming population both blame the current attacks and Counter attacks against each community on the increase desertification of the lake chad basin and the forced migration option by nomadic herdsmen to seek alternative grazing field for their cattle. These clashes have seen a steady increase of violent conflict in the North Central region of Nigeria with the Global Terrorism Index rating the Fulani Herder crisis the fourth deadliest terrorist group in the world. How Climate Change Helps Boko Haram Tactics in Lake Chad Basin In the North East of Nigeria, Boko Haram exploited the shrinking of the lake chad basin to increase its rank and file by forcefully but also voluntarily trapping and recruiting local fishermen, herders and farmers who were attracted to the region during the raining season to fish, graze and plant in swampy areas. These men mostly had no other livelihood to sustain on as the drought as desertification consumed most of the fertile land. These men not only became key fighters of Boko Haram, but some were used for surveillance, reconnaissance missions, source of funding and for logistics purpose due to their legitimate need to be on a constant move. From and angle of self-help, especially where local Government security forces cannot be trusted or relied upon, local Fulani herders are prepared to take ‘Do It Yourself’ deadly action against cattle rustlers and local farmers when they and/or their cattle is under threat or attack. As Fulani nomadic pastoralist migrate to escape desertification and droughts in search of fresh grazing land for their cattle, they arm themselves or high mercenaries who carry sophisticated weapons for protection. They venture into alternative cattle routes to avoid regular ambush on marked cattle routes. The problem is that alternative cattle routes generate further conflict as the farms and crops of local farmers are destroyed in the process leading to more deadly clashes with local farmers. It is a vicious circle but the core is climate change and a government with no proactive response. The Nomad -Jihadist Nexus, the need to protect cattle – Mali Between 2011-2012 in Timbuktu, Mali, the nomadic Tuaregs in the desert town of Tayshak became extremely desperate as severe desertification resulted in animal diseases, cattle rustling and an increase in dying stock made worse by limited grazing fields and failed wells. The rise of MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 2012 was thanks to a free flow of sophisticated weapons from the Libya crisis, easily accessible to returning mercenaries. These weapons provided a golden opportunity for jihadist to rally the attention of the local Tuaregs by exploiting the ungoverned space and really bad conditions on ground that the government had failed to address. As the MNLA movement grew in strength and became a force to reckon with; vulnerable, angry, socially excluded and dislocated young Tuareg nomads became easily enticed to the security, financial and ideological benefits of belonging to jihadist groups like MNLA, Ansar Ed- Dine and AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). These young men immediately became rich over night with regular salaries, arms to protect the limited cattle they could keep and power to stand out as heroes in their local communities. The violent narrative of the MNLA Jihadist would not have gone down as easy as it did without the devastating life-threatening impact of climate change on the direct livelihood of these local Tuareg nomads and the failure of the government to do something meaningful. The Kenya case of resource cause In the North Rift and North-Eastern regions of Kenya, competition for natural resources like water and grazing land resulted in deadly clashes between local Pastoralist from the Samburu and the Ndorobo tribes triggered by accusations of cattle rustling. Like most Fulani herdsmen, local pastoralist in Kenya treat their livestock as a symbol of wealth and livelihood. Communal sharing of available grazing land becomes problematic when grazing fields shrink and water dries up due to drought and famine. As cattle’s die in huge numbers, cattle rustling activities increase as communities’ struggle to replenish lost stock by hook or by crook but also engage in brutal conflicts over the use of limited grazing

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