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COUNTER TERRORISM

CURATED OSINT

German’s Chancellor, Merkel kicks off West Africa tour pledging to support fight against terrorism

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Boosting counter-terrorism support for countries in West Africa has become one of Angela Merkel’s main priorities on the continent. The chancellor has now pledged millions to improve security in the Sahel region. German Chancellor Angela Merkel started her tour of West Africa on Wednesday, a trip that will see her visit Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger…

The post German’s Chancellor, Merkel kicks off West Africa tour pledging to support fight against terrorism appeared first on Global Sentinel.

CURATED OSINT

‘Counter-terrorism requires global approach’

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The G5 Sahel Permanent Secretary, Maman Sambo Sidikou has restated that the fight against terrorism in the region requires a comprehensive approach, coupled with further consultations and intelligence-sharing. The Permanent Secretary of this bloc made the announcement after meeting the Ivorian president, Alassane Ouattara in Abidjan on Tuesday. “Our destinies are common. We ought to…

The post ‘Counter-terrorism requires global approach’ appeared first on Global Sentinel.

CURATED OSINT

Alleged Embezzlement: Vested interests trying to discredit military counter-terrorism efforts-DHQ

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•Blames one Idris Ahmed as sponsor of campaign of calumny •Urge troops to disregard the ‘false message’   Godsgift Onyedinefu   The Defence Headquarters (DHQ) has dismissed the allegations by some soldiers accusing Army Generals of embezzling allowances meant for the troops and nearly N10bn counter terrorism fund, as a mischievous efforts of some vested…

The post Alleged Embezzlement: Vested interests trying to discredit military counter-terrorism efforts-DHQ appeared first on Global Sentinel.

CURATED OSINT

Nigerian Army allegedly embezzles N10bn counter-terrorism fund

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•Soldiers now eat like beggars   Godsgift Onyedinefu   The senior officers of the Nigerian Army have been accused of alleged massive corruption and embezzling of nearly N10 billion meant for the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram terrorists in the North East Nigeria. According to the sources the fund was allocated by the…

The post Nigerian Army allegedly embezzles N10bn counter-terrorism fund appeared first on Global Sentinel.

TERRORISM

Which Africa Jihadists Group Ambushed US Troops in Tongo – Tongo Niger?

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Introduction The fallout in Washington after the ambush in Tongo-Tongo, Niger that resulted in the deaths of Three Green Berets, one support soldier and four Nigerien forces and several wounded during the October 4th incident has morphed from shock and confusion regarding the incident to becoming a full-fledged media circus; regarding who knew about the US troops being in the region and under what circumstances they were deployed in such a volatile region that has a combination of pro and competing Jihadist groups (AL-Qaeda and ISIL) factions. What is the National Security threat that warrants a presence of 800 United States troops in the Sahel? The answer may fall back to a decision made during the Bush (43) Administration. In the days and weeks after 9/11, Congress passed Public Law 107-40[1] authorizing the use of force against those the President suspected to have planned, authorized, committed or aided the attacks launched against the United States, those who harbored such people and their affiliated organizations. The objective was to prevent any further acts of terrorism directed against the United States by such persons, organizations or nations.   How does the AUMF apply to Niger? Consider two events in the Maghreb over the last few decades. First, the Algerian Civil War of 1992. This violent event erupted when the Algerian Military saw fit to cancel a run of elections[1] for Parliament. That decision resulted to violence between Islamic Fundamentalists and Secular Algerians. The Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win power after these polls. Subsequently, the carnage led to many factions splitting from previous groups and charting their own course in the North Africa region. During the darkest days of the conflict one powerful Islamist group emerged, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It first gained prominence in 1998 by splitting away from a previous group that it severed ties with. The GSPC is today notoriously referred to as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and it has spread its tentacles southward into the Sahel splitting into various factions like Al Mourabitoum for tactical purposes. Virtually unchallenged for more than two decades, this different jihadists groups are now influencing events in Mali and regional states like Niger since 2012. The second event is the execution of the Libya former leader Muhammar Gaddafi, the subsequent collapse of Libya into a sustained period of Civil War and the emergence of many criminal and Salafist Jihadist groups backed by both Al-Qaeda and ISIL core. The chaos that ensued resulted into; The outflow of weapons from Libya into the region[2]. The ability for fighters to move through the region with ease[3]. The Migrant Crisis that has affected Europe. The events of 2011 set into motion the current crisis in Mali, Burkina- Faso, Niger and the region in general over the last couple of years. The leadership vacuum in Libya has had a ripple effect to the current rising instability in the Sahel and there are no signs of better days ahead.   US – French Response:   To manage the growing instability in the Sahel, the French set up a reaction force known as Operation Barkhane with its main base in N’Djamena – Chad.[1] This operation has been underway since 2014. Contrary to the TSCTI (Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative) which the United States has had in operation since 2006 under the banner of the ‘Global War on Terror’, it is expected that effective response can only be achieved when there is collaboration between both countries, in coordination with local national forces. The deadly event of 4th October questions the effectiveness of intelligence sharing and response collaboration and coordination between US, French and local Nigerien forces. It equally raises the question of transparency, interest and trust by all parties involved. There is no doubt that there exists a certain level of collaboration between AFRICOM (US African Command) and the French in the Sahel in terms of sharing Intelligence[2], but same cannot be applied to local forces who are mostly at the forefront on ground but undermined due to trust issues. Between the US and French, the level of timely information dissemination is very murky. This level of suspicion based on long term interest, lack of trust with local forces and wanting to be ‘the one who solved the problem’ can have a deadly outcome as seen in the recent ambush. Having the French Air Force scramble their jets over the surface of the attack zone hours after the attack and evacuate the US Casualties highlights the strong bond between the French and American Armed Forces in the region and beyond. However, there is a Marine Air and Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that is designed for use in Africa and based in Spain, but the response time in remote areas like Niger make it difficult, compared to the quick one hour practiced in the likes of Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.   Change is permanent: The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) currently being used since 2001 needs a serious review. Local forces do not have the same level of ability and capability like their foreign counterparts; however, they have local experience and understand the backyard culture more. In an asymmetric warfare such as the one in the Sahel, ‘Culture eats strategy for breakfast, lunch and supper’. Local forces should not be neglected in the intelligence sharing and coordination process, this must follow a training process based on ‘all that we know, not all that we want you to know’. Without a timely and transparent intelligence sharing between all parties involved both at strategic, planning and operational levels, there will be permanent damage to lives of brave men and women on the front-line.   Which Jihadist Group Killed the US-Nigerien Forces? The Jihadist Movement in the Sahel has split into factions that support either Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State on the ideological level. There exist Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) with factions that now include: ‘The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’ (ISGS) under

TERRORISM

Security Forces Brutal Interrogation Tactics Favor Boko Haram

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Amnesty International’s report on the Cameroonian Military’s brutal interrogation tactics could place the population at odds with the security services and end up benefiting Boko Haram in multiple ways.     Understanding the complexity and sensitivity of handling insurgency groups and their influence to the local population within a specified vulnerable environment, is key to any long lasting designed Anti-Terrorism and Counter terrorism solution. The vital need for authorities to gather timely information through interrogation for the purposed of addressing underlying causal factors, groups capabilities; networks, training, logistics and tackling potential targets requires a very well-trained security service. Anything less results in mistakes and inhuman treatments that could turn the initial objective inside out, eliminating any chances of winning the hearts and minds of the population. When faced with an invincible and faceless insurgency movement like Boko Haram, it is far better to let 99 ‘looking guilty’ suspects go free than treat 1 innocent man or woman in such a degrading manner. THE EFFECT OF THE POOR INTERROGATION TACTICS REPORT Beside the international condemnation and negative exposure of the ineffective and disastrous methods of tackling the Boko Haram crisis, security services need TRUST from the local population if they are to ever succeed to tackle the growing insurgency in Northern Cameroon and the other affected African Countries. Amnesty International has reported similar brutal interrogation tactics in Nigeria as well. The unexpected consequence is simple. This most recent Amnesty international report on Cameroon is very likely to radicalize more vulnerable victims (If not already) who perceive real injustice from the authority that is tasked to protect and preserve peace. These types of exposed inhuman treatment will likely bolster the propaganda of Boko Haram to vulnerable citizens and even fighters who may be contemplating exit. The message will be evidently clear – you are better off with US than with THEM. In the worst-case scenario, we may likely see an upsurge of targeted but random attacks against the identified forces, The Rapid Intervention Force Aka BIR, other national security personnel and western targets identified in the report as US and French forces. BETTER TRAINING CAN PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCE There are multiple tested methodologies of extracting information for gathering intelligence from suspected terrorist or criminals without the need to use torture and other inhuman or degrading treatments. The right training does the trick with the right resources. The absence of the right or adequate interrogation training mostly provided by foreign states with little or no knowledge of the people and their cultural is the fundamental causation factor.  This is made worse by the lack of client knowledge of possible counterproductive consequences when things hit the fan. Inadequate training leaves trainees with only a ‘hammer’ as a tool, thus every problem ends up being treated as a nail. Insurgency groups that use terror tactic like Boko Haram take advantage of security forces poor interrogation tactics to stay active, by attracting more recruits to continue their activities because they will not be protected by the governance system. It has been said more often, that ‘revolutions’ are caused and sustained NOT by the direct actions of ‘revolutionaries’ themselves but by the stupid reaction of state security services – here we have it in Northern Cameroon. With the right training in place, from the right partners, such inhuman treatments of suspects will be completely unnecessary.   Written By Bulwark Intelligence Senior Contributor: David Otto David Otto is the CT Director of TGS Intelligence Consultants Ltd and the Preventing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Programme – Step In Step Out (SISO) based in the United Kingdom. He is also the Senior Counter Terrorism Advisor for Global Risk International. Follow me on Twitter: @ottotgs

TERRORISM

UK Counter Terrorism Strategy Has Been Based On Luck And This Has To Change

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The United Kingdom has arguably the top counter-terrorism practitioners in the world.  The U.S. Army Special Forces’ Delta Force was modeled from the British Special Air Services. MI-6 is the top partner to the US Intelligence Community and MI5’s camera surveillance platform is the most comprehensive imagery collection platform in any city in the world. The Metropolitan Police are well trained, with a long history of deep penetration in the community. There is little question that the UK has world-class counter terrorism capacity and capability, both theoretical and operational, but recent attacks indicate that their anti-terrorism strategy needs reform. They’ve had a bad year. After the Manchester bombing at the concert hall, response arrests were quick and far-reaching – perpetrators, planners, collaborators, financiers and others were swooped up and brought to book if enough evidence was gathered. During the subsequent election cycle in the UK today, politicians promised to redouble their efforts (redoubling implies you have already doubled, and even the doubling was inadequate to stop the attack in question). More armed and unarmed police were deployed in the streets.  Military units were dispatched to supplement the police to create a deterrent tactic in support of a protect strategy.  Counter-terrorism resources were immediately deployed where needed. 2 weeks later, a coordinated double attack in 2 disparate areas against different targets using different tactics took the country by surprise.  These attacks suggested that future operations have the potential to be more complex, far-reaching and lethal. The counter-terrorism strategy did not address the root cause; however, it did result in increased reaction time and decreased potential lethality – good news, but not for those who were already dead or wounded. There must be something broken or missing.  There is:  an Anti-Terrorism Strategy that works in concert with the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, where the contributing factors to radicalize individuals can be identified, surveilled and actioned when necessary. My “Triangle Terror Model” illustrates the three components of any terrorist attack: CAPABILITY, MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY/TARGET. For any successful attack to happen, the three elements of the “Terror Triangle” must be in concert with each other to radicalize and action the actors involved. Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies should be effectively coordinated to reduce or eliminate these three elements. The combination of an effective anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy combines to create a condition where attacks simply cannot take place. “The “Terror Triangle,” which shows the three necessary elements for a terrorist attack, clearly delineates the relationship between anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. Looking at The Terror Triangle model, we can see where the UK successes and failures happened: Motivation: Online and offline platform recruitment strategies connected at-risk individuals with an extremist ideology that boosted their susceptibility to embrace radicalization which leads to extremism (failure of anti-terrorism or prevent). Capability: The organization (in this cases, ISIS) directly or indirectly provides logistical support through an existing network to plan, equip and execute attacks to a valuable target (A combined failure of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism). Opportunity: Timely surveillance and choice of hard or soft target based on symbols. The targets in the past 3 UK attacks were considered “soft targets.” These are less-protected, more populated areas or events that are lower visibility (than a government building, police headquarters, military installation, etc.). This suggests that the general population is the target rather than a governmental policy (success in the protection of hard targets and rapid response (successful counterterrorism) but failure to recognize and protect the soft targets that were randomly determined, surveilled and ultimately attacked, to varying degrees of success is a failure of anti-terrorism – Protect). Quick response is a damage limitation tactic and it often comes too late for many unfortunate innocent civilians. The UK counter terrorism strategy cannot be waged heavily on luck and quick response alone. A comprehensive coordination between Anti-Terrorism strategy and Counter-Terrorism strategy driven by a cohesion of trust between the affected communities and the UK government is paramount for a successful overall strategy to provide security and stability. Written By Bulwark Intelligence Senior Contributor: David Otto David Otto is the CT Director of TGS Intelligence Consultants Ltd and the Preventing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Programme – Step In Step Out (SISO) based in the United Kingdom. He is also the Senior Counter Terrorism Advisor for Global Risk International. Follow me on Twitter: @ottotgs

INTELLIGENCE, TERRORISM

What is Really Going On with Boko Haram 

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  Boko Haram fractures into two factions On June 21st, U.S Marine Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser the nominee to lead the U.S military’s Africa Command sat at his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee and whilst discussing Boko Haram said    Lt.Gen Waldhauser during his senate hearing on June 21st 2016. “Several months ago, about half of Boko Haram broke off to a separate group because they were not happy with the amount of buy-in, if you will, from Boko Haram into the ISIL brand. Shekau has not fallen into line with Islamic State’s instructions, including by ignoring calls for Boko Haram to stop using children as suicide bombers. He’s been told by ISIL to stop doing that. But he has not done so. And that’s one of the reasons why this splinter group has broken off. the general indicated that the Islamic State was trying to reconcile the two groups but that Mr. Shekau had “not really fallen into line with what ISIL would like him to do.” However, on August 3rd, IS released the 41st edition of the Islamic State’s Al-Naba magazine in which it interviewed Abu Musab al-Barnawi who they referred to as Boko Haram’s “governor” for West Africa. Abu Musab al-Barnawi was previously known as the spokesman for Boko Haram, thus this new label indicated a promotion for al-Barnawi. The Islamic publication interview depicted an internal fracture that was birthed as a result of Shekau’s insistence on indiscriminate killing, compared to al-Barnawi’s faction who were against the killings of Muslims. It confirmed previous suspicious about disharmony within Boko Haram and also gave some insight into the thinking and knowledge that the Boko Haram leaders have on Christianity and the military. Al-Naba magazine interview with Abu Musab al-Barnawi on 3rd August 2016   One of the questions the interviewer asked al-Barnawi was with regards to the participation of the Multinational Joint Task Force made up of the four countries affected by Boko Haram. Al-Barnawi responded saying: “We do see their fighter jets and surveillance airplanes flying over us frequently, especially lately while trying to chase us out of the Lake of Chad. That being said their involvement is limited to air support with no on ground presence”.* He showed that Boko Haram in the region had carried out extensive surveillance and reconnaissance of military operations in the area, describing their operations. He said: “Operations are run from joint operation room in Niger, and when they decide to attack, French and US send surveillance drones from their bases in Niger to locate us. Then joint African forces will carry an on ground assault backed by heavy air support”.* He referred to the Civilians who assist the military (CJTF) as “Stick Campaign” saying: “As for the “Sticks Campaign” people, they are civilians using sticks and swords to fight al-Mujahideen, armed by Nigerian military, charged to chase us out of towns we control, and were called Civilians JTF. Most of them have deserted while others are mainly now providing information about our locations because they [JTF members] are from the area and know it well”.* Civilian JTF fighters in the North-East. Source: Premium Times Al-Barnawi gave his own statistics about the diversity between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. This information shed insight into the thinking among Boko Haram about the role of Christianity in Nigeria. The ISIS interviewer asked the question: Question: It is known that Christians aim at controlling most of Africa; can you tell us about this and the situation of countries fighting you? “Christians succeeded at controlling large parts of Africa. For instance, in Nigeria at the end of last century there were representing 20% and were living mostly in the south. But today their numbers have increased and they control more areas, even in the north, and the percentage increased to 35%. They control areas where anyone Muslims cannot approach, but we promise to change that.” Question: Can you talk to us about Christians activities in West Africa and how you are facing the challenge? “Christians activity is enormous in this country [Nigeria] while taking advantage of poor living conditions of people. They entice Muslim population with money and possibilities to move to the West. Thus there are only few Mujahideen who are opposed to them. Westerners [Christians] are taking advantage of poor conditions of people by offering food and shelter to refugees, and proselytizing their children without noticing. For this reason we are trying to destroy every church when able to and kill as many as we can and those supporting them. Additionally we raise awareness about the danger of Christian organizations that only came here to proselytize while using humanitarian work as a cover up. The response against these organizations was great.”* The interviewer then asked al-Barnawi about attacks on Muslims in Mosques and markets and this was seen as an opportunity for al-Barnawi to explain his grievances with Boko Haram’s strategy under Shekau: Question: What are your thoughts about the media reporting your attacks on mosques and markets where Muslims are present? “I am glad you asked this question because was looking for an opportunity to raise this issue. Those carried attacks on mosques, markets, and other venues belonging to Muslims do not represent IS, they only represent themselves. We also don’t consider or associate automatically people living in the area controlled by our enemy as traitors. We don’t authorize or approve such attacks.”*   Shekau’s Response After the news of this promotion broke on BBC, Abubakar Shekau who had not been heard from publically since March released an audio message in response. The Boko Haram leader stated that he is responding based on “the message he heard on the World Radio”. This statement confirms the knowledge that much of the information Shekau receives about global affairs and world news is via the radio, probably BBC Hausa radio service. Shekau released a video and audio message to prove that he is still in charge. In the message, he described al-Barnawi as

COUNTER INSURGENCY

Insistence on Communicating Boko Haram Defeat Could Be Counterproductive

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Communication  of Boko Haram defeat may start giving people a false sense of security in a situation where caution needs to remain high. Insurgents struck Madagali, Adamawa state at about 2.30am on Monday. According to residents in the area, the insurgents operated unchallenged for many hours as the soldiers deployed to the area where nowhere to be found that night. The Federal Government and military leadership keep insisting that Boko Haram’s ability to carry out attacks have been impeded. The challenge with this type of “Boko Haram is defeated” communication is that it may start giving people a false sense of security in a situation where caution needs to remain high. It may also start giving even the soldiers a sense of a breather where even they may start looking to wind down the tempo. People subconsciously rest on their laurels when they believe that the fight is over. This sort of message also seems to get the adversary energized with renewed commitment to prove the government wrong. Case in point was the mission accomplished speech U.S President George Bush gave on board an aircraft carrier in which he declared that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” and that “in the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.” Unbeknownst to Bush, most of deaths of troops and civilian casualties would occur after that speech. If Bush had foresight of this, he would have resisted giving that speech prematurely! Back in February 2015 when Boko Haram attacks were audacious and incessant, the FG kept releasing statements that suggested Boko Haram was being defeated because they had been reduced to “just a few states” compared to when it was attacking 6 other states in the North and FCT Abuja. Almost a year later, the new FG leadership continues to insist that Boko Haram has been defeated saying that they can no longer launch military style attacks but are now “reduced” to IED attacks. Whether they have gone from 6 states to 3, or gone from military style attacks to IED attacks, it is important that government does not disregard the reality on the ground in an attempt to find the silver lining in a dire situation. The goal should be for no attacks whatsoever. The post 9/11 world makes this a difficult goal to achieve. So if attacks do occur, it should be few and far between, not several times a month. And until we get to that level, the government should resist from insisting that Boko Haram has been defeated, but instead allow the results speak for themselves. Confirmation on whether or not Boko Haram is a thing of the past should be given by members of the public instead of the government, lest the latter appear as seeking to score political points where they have little control in predicting insurgent actions. Some may argue that it is done so as to help boost troop morale. But if this is the goal, troop morale can be increased by giving out awards, promotions, and other education, health, financial and insurance benefits for the servicemen and their families. Where the Focus Should Be The military needs to continue mounting pressure on the remaining insurgents that are still in hiding and carrying out attacks. They need to increase collaboration among the neighboring countries because it is becoming more apparent that the insurgents are taking great advantage of the porous borders to take refuge on one side of the border while they carry out attacks on the other side. Victims in the Adamawa Boko Haram attack lamented the absence of military troops during the raid. This is the sort of scenario that may continue to occur once the government decides Boko Haram is defeated and it’s time for them to start drawing down. Using Afghanistan Taliban insurgency and the Iraqi war, as examples, President Barack Obama had decided to draw down troops and completely evacuate American troops from the area. The plan was U.S troops will train the local Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they would carry on with the task of protecting their countries. The U.S pulled out of Iraq and ISIS took hold in certain parts. Obama eventually had to put a stop to the complete withdrawal of U.S troops in Afghanistan as during the draw down, the Taliban resurged and started taking over some provinces and towns in the outskirts. The Nigerian government needs to learn something from this Iraq-Afghanistan situation. The military cannot remain in the tri-state (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) forever. Sooner or later, they are going to start winding down the Operation but they will have to ensure they have adequately trained the Nigerian Police Force and other local security agencies that will be responsible for the protection of civilians and the communities once they start moving back and the military start moving out. Is the Nigerian Police Ready to Take Over the Counter-insurgency Fight? This is where things get a bit worrying! The Nigerian police are currently still struggling with protecting Nigerian citizens from local crime and criminal perpetrators. This week there were reports of clashes between some Shia’ groups and rival Muslim youth; There was election violence in Bayelsa; an Ondo government aspirant was kidnapped in Abuja; another set of kidnappers abducted a Pastor in the middle of a church service in Kogi state.  In addition to the aforementioned, the country at any given time is dealing with armed robbery, cult clashes, and herdsmen attacks, civil unrests and so on. The police are already dealing with a lot despite its manning issues. The Army needs to start integrating other security forces operatives with them for the purpose of preparing them to continue the security of these communities and its occupants. There needs to be more joint patrols and exercises between the Army and the Police Force operative who will carry the baton once the military operation has been concluded. Hopefully, this phase in the Boko Haram insurgency really is

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